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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (2002).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it enforced the
forum selection clause in Jacobsen's form contract and thereby contravened Utah public
policy and generated duplicative litigation in two states?
Standard of Review. The trial court's enforcement of a forum selection
clause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., Inc., 868
P.2d 809, 810 (Utah 1994); see also Durdahl v. National Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d
525, 528 (Wyo. 1999). While Wyoming law governs the interpretation of Jacobsen's
Contract, the Court looks to the public policies of the forum state—Utah—in determining
whether to extend comity to Wyoming. See Durdahl 988 P.2d at 528; see also Trillium,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Commas, 2001 UT 101, ^ 19, 37 P.3d 1093. This issue
was raised below. See Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 5-7 [R.45-47];
Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 8-9 [R. 128-29].
Issue No. 2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found
jurisdiction over subcontractor-defendants where Jacobsen's form contract involves
construction improvements to real property in Wyoming, was negotiated and performed
in Wyoming, contains a bald forum selection clause for Utah—but no consent-tojurisdiction clause—and the only connection to Utah is Jacobsen's main office?
1

Standard of Review. Since the motion to dismiss was supported only by
affidavits, an appeal from the trial court's decision "presents only legal questions that are
reviewed for correctness." Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120,
1121 (Utah 1992). This issue was raised below. See Memorandum Supporting Motion
to Dismiss at 12-14 [R.52-54]; Reply Memorandum Supporting Motion to Dismiss at 18 [R.121-28].
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3 is of central importance to the
determination of Issue Number 1, above. This provision reads, in pertinent part:
(2)
A provision in a construction agreement
requiring a dispute arising under the agreement to be resolved
in a forum outside of this state is void and unenforceable as
against the public policy of this state if:
(a)
one of the parties to the agreement is
domiciled in this state; and
(b)
work to be done and the equipment and
materials to be supplied under the agreement involves
a construction project in this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2) (2001).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE
The general contractor, Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc.,

("Jacobsen"), sued its carpentry subcontractor, Teton Builders, and Teton Builders'
president, Thomas R. Hunter ("Hunter") (collectively "Subcontractors") on Jacobsen's
form subcontract agreement ("Jacobsen's Contract") executed by the parties. Jacobsen's
Contract provides for the construction of improvements on real property located in
Wyoming, Jacobsen maintains an office in Wyoming, and Jacobsen's Contract was
negotiated and performed solely in Wyoming. Subcontractors are both domiciled in
Wyoming, and Subcontractors have no Utah contacts whatsoever. Thomas R. Hunter
Affidavit ("Hunter Aff") atffif2-20. [R.42-44.] The parties stated that Wyoming law
governs Jacobsen's Contract. Contract at ^f 8(1) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.17.] The only
connection to Utah in this case is Jacobsen's head office located in Utah. The forum
selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract designates Utah as the venue for resolving
disputes. Id at f 7(C). [R.16.] Jacobsen's Contract does not include a consent-tojurisdiction clause by Subcontractors.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Subcontractors moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial

court determined that the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract is enforceable
under Wyoming law. Transcript at 30 (Exhibit C, attached). The trial court ruled that
Subcontractors agreed to the venue provision and impliedly consented to personal
3

jurisdiction in Utah. Id. Then, applying the "rational nexus" test set forth in Phone
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,114, 8 P.3d 256, the trial court determined
that the lone fact of Jacobsen's Utah domicile was a sufficient "rational nexus" with Utah
on which to find personal jurisdiction over Subcontractors and denied the motion to
dismiss. Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2 (Exhibit D, attached).
[R.14L] This Court granted an interlocutory appeal.
Ill-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Subcontractors, both residents of Jackson, Wyoming, presented

uncontroverted evidence below that they have no contacts whatsoever with Utah. They
have never worked, advertised, contracted, or conducted business of any nature within
Utah's borders. Subcontractors executed Jacobsen's Contract to perform framing work
on a hotel construction project on real property located in Jackson, Wyoming (the
"Property").1 Jacobsen was the general contractor. Jacobsen's Wyoming-based
employees finalized Jacobsen's Contract with Subcontractors through Jacobsen's
Wyoming office, and the parties signed Jacobsen's Contract in Wyoming. All work
under Jacobsen's Contract was performed in Wyoming, where the Property is located.
Hunter Aff. atffi[2-10, 18-19. [R.37-38.]
Jacobsen's Contract contains a forum selection provision that reads: "All
arbitration proceedings and litigation shall take place within Salt Lake County, State of
1

Subcontractors also executed Jacobsen's form Subcontract Work Order, which is
attached as Exhibit B.
4

Utah." Contract at ^ 7(C) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.16.] Jacobsen's Contract also
contains a choice of law provision electing Wyoming law: "This Agreement... shall be
deemed to have been made in and shall be interpreted under the laws of the place where
the project is located." Id. at ^f 8(1). [R.17.] There is no consent-to-jurisdiction clause in
Jacobsen's Contract.
Teton Builders recorded a mechanic's lien notice against the Property in
Wyoming. Statement of Claim for Mechanics and Materialmens Lien (the "Lien
Notice") (attached within Exhibit B to Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss). [R. 102-04.] Jacobsen filed a second action regarding this same dispute,
currently pending in Wyoming state court, in which Jacobsen has sought to strike the lien
against the Property. Richard Kirkham Affidavit atffi[8-10. [R. 114.]
Jacobsen obtained a payment bond (the "Payment Bond") from United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ("US Fidelity") as substitute security for Teton
Builders' mechanic's lien in the event that the Wyoming court does not strike the lien.
Id. at H 10. [R.114-15, 118-20.] The Payment Bond is payable to the owner of the
Property, FS Jackson Hole Development Company, LLC, ("FS Jackson Hole"), and not
Subcontractors. Payment Bond (attached as E^x. 1 1o Kirkham Affidavit). [R.l 18.] FS
Jackson Hole is a Delaware limited liability company domiciled in Wyoming. Lien
Notice [R.102.] US Fidelity is a Maryland corporation domiciled in Minnesota. Payment
Bond. [R.l 18-19.]

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The forum selection clause is unreasonable and against Utah public policy.
Utah public policy recognizes the importance of requiring construction litigation to be
adjudicated in the state where the subject property is located, along with the need to bring
disputes in one action. It is unreasonable and unfair to force Subcontractors to defend
two competing lawsuits in Wyoming and Utah—an inevitable result if the trial court
retains jurisdiction. On these bases, the Court should determine that the forum selection
clause is unenforceable.
The trial court's ruling further raises a question of first impression, namely,
what standards should determine personal jurisdiction where an out-of-state
subcontractor with no Utah contacts signs a Utah general contractor's form construction
contract containing a Utah forum selection clause—but no consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
This dispute has no relation to Utah but is instead centered upon out-of-state real
property. Based on the plurality of opinions in Henderson, the "rational nexus" test only
governs contracts that include consent-to-jurisdiction clauses. Thus, traditional minimum
contacts analysis applies here. Since Subcontractors have no minimum contacts, this
action should be dismissed and the parties should resolve their dispute in Jacobsen's
second action in Wyoming.
Finally, even if the "rational nexus" test should apply here, the trial court
misapplied it. Because Jacobsen's Contract was for construction improvements to real
property located outside Utah, Jacobsen acted as a Wyoming resident with respect to
6

Jacobsen's Contract, and the only connection to Utah is the fact of Jacobsen's head
office, there is no "rational nexus."
This Court should reverse and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ENFORCED JACOBSEN'S
FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE BECAUSE THE CLAUSE IS
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST UTAH PUBLIC POLICY,
Before even reaching the issue of personal jurisdiction, the trial court

should have determined that the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract is
unenforceable. Under Jacobsen's Contract, Wyoming law governs. See Contract at ^f
8(1) (Exhibit A, attached). [R.17.] In Wyoming—as in Utah and other jurisdictions—a
forum selection clause is not enforceable if it is unreasonable, against a public policy of
the forum state, or the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient. See Durdahl v. National
Safety Assocs., Inc., 988 P.2d 525, 528, 530 (Wyo. 1999). Accord Prows v. Pinpoint
Retail Sys., Inc., 868 P.2d 809, 812-13 (Utah 1994) (finding forum selection clause
unenforceable based on a number of factors, including increased cost, policy
considerations, unfairness, and inconvenience); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Enforcement of the forum selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract
is unreasonable, against public policy, and seriously inconvenient. Based on the totality
of these circumstances, the forum selection clause should not be enforced, particularly
where the improvements to the subject property are located in Wyoming and Jacobsen's
second action regarding the lien is pending in Wyoming.
7

A.

Enforcement of Jacobsen's Forum Selection Clause Is
Unreasonable and It Violates Utah Public Policy Regarding the
Venue for Construction Disputes.

The Utah Legislature has recognized a public policy of voiding out-of-state
forum selection clauses in construction litigation that involves Utah real property. See
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2) (cited in full in Determinative Provision section, above).
Importantly, it is the public policy of the forum state—Utah—that controls the Court's
analysis of whether to enforce the forum selection clause. See Durdahl, 988 P.2d at 528
(holding that while Tennessee law governed contract, Wyoming court will enforce law of
foreign jurisdiction "so long as that law is not contrary to Wyoming law, public policy, or
the general interests of Wyoming's citizens").
As stated by the Bremen Court, "A contractual choice-of-forum clause
should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of
the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision." 407
U.S. at 15; see also Robv v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363 (2dCir. 1993)
(although parties chose English law in contract, holding under Bremen that forum
selection clause is unreasonable if it "contravene[s] a strong public policy of the forum
state"). Likewise, this Court has recognized that when determining whether to extend
comity to another state's laws, "'[o]f primary importance [to Utah courts] is whether
[Utah's] public policies . . . would be contravened if comity were extended.'" Trillium,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 2001 UT 101,1f 19, 37 P.3d 1093 (quoting

8

Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 771 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)).
Utah public policy relating to the venue for construction disputes is set
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3. Under this provision, if there is a dispute involving
construction work performed in Utah and a Utah resident, a forum selection clause that
requires litigation of that construction dispute in a forum other than Utah violates Utah's
public policy and is unenforceable. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-3(2). Utah is not alone
in recognizing the importance of keeping construction litigation within the forum where
the property is located. Admittedly, the present case involves an inverse scenario—
namely a Utah forum selection clause involving improvements to Wyoming real
property. However, the same Utah public policy should apply when a Utah court is asked
to adjudicate disputes over real property in Wyoming. The Court should refuse to
enforce a Utah forum selection clause involving Wyoming real property where the Utah
resident is also resident in Wyoming, maintains offices in Wyoming, and seeks out
business in Wyoming. As a matter of public policy, there is no compelling reason for
Utah courts to waste judicial resources serving as the adjudicator of Wyoming's real
property disputes.

2

See V. Frederic Lyon & Douglas W. Ackerman, Controlling Disputes by Controlling
the Forum: Forum Selection Clauses in Construction Contracts, 22 Construction Law. 15, 21 &
nn.70-72 (Fall 2002) (citing similar provisions in Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah).
9

B,

Public Policy Concerns Militate in Favor of Refusing to Enforce
Jacobsen's Forum Selection Clause, Which Generates
Duplicative, Bifurcated Litigation over the Same Facts.

Jacobsen's filing of litigation in two states was spawned by the forum
selection clause in Jacobsen's Contract; therefore, enforcement of the forum selection
clause is unreasonable, seriously inconvenient, and against public policy. See Durdahl,
988 P.2d at 528, 530; Prows, 868 P.2d at 812-13. The perpetuation of this action in Utah
will not eliminate the second Jacobsen litigation that Subcontractors must defend in
Wyoming regarding the same facts, nor the Payment Bond litigation that will occur in
Wyoming regarding the same facts.
This Court in Prows recognized Utah's public policy of avoiding bifurcated
litigation. The Utah-resident plaintiff in that case, Prows, brought suit in Utah against
two co-defendants, Flying J in Utah and Pinpoint in New York, notwithstanding a New
York forum selection clause in the contract to which Pinpoint, but not Flying J, was a
party. Prows, 868 P.2d at 809-10. Pinpoint moved to dismiss for lack of venue, seeking
to enforce the New York forum selection clause, which would have resulted in a New
York action against Pinpoint and a Utah action against Flying J. Id at 813. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and this Court affirmed, recognizing that "[requiring
a bifurcated trial on the same issues contravenes the 'objective of modern procedure,'
which is to 'litigate all claims in one action if that is possible.'" Id. at 813 (quoting
Dversburg Mach. Works, Inc. v. Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378, 380-81 (Tenn.
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1983)). Based on these "policy considerations" and other factors, such as the unfairness,
inconvenience, and increased cost of maintaining two separate actions over the same
facts, the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling invalidating the forum selection clause.

14
The result here should be no different. Indeed, Subcontractors and
Jacobsen are already involved in Jacobsen's mechanic's lien litigation in Wyoming. See
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at Ex. B. [R.96-107.]
Attempting to avoid Teton Builders' Wyoming lien foreclosure action, Jacobsen has
provided the Payment Bond, issued by US Fidelity, to the owner of the Property, FS
Jackson Hole. [R. 118.] However, the Payment Bond does not, as Jacobsen suggested to
the trial court, open Utah's courts to all of Subcontractors' claims relating to the Property.
While Subcontractors' counterclaim against Jacobsen can be brought in
Wyoming or Utah, claims related to Subcontractors' mechanic's lien and the Payment
Bond are inseparably connected to Wyoming. Based on the filing of the Payment Bond,
the mechanic's lien is discharged and the Payment Bond is substituted for the lien. See
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-310. Nevertheless, Teton Builders cannot bring an action in Utah
on the Payment Bond unless the trial court in Utah is able to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the owner, FS Jackson Hole, and eventually perhaps the bonding
company, US Fidelity.

11

As with Flying J in the Prows case, neither FS Jackson Hole nor US
Fidelity was a party to Jacobsen's Contract containing the forum selection clause.
Moreover, like Flying J in Prows, there was no evidence below that FS Jackson Hole—
domiciled in Wyoming—or US Fidelity—domiciled in Minnesota—is subject to personal
jurisdiction in the selected forum (Utah). 3 As a result, there may be no basis for Teton
Builders to sue in Utah on the Payment Bond. Indeed, for lack of personal jurisdiction,
Utah courts "'would be closed to the suit'" on the Payment Bond—yet another proper
basis under Prows for invalidating the forum selection clause. 868 P.2d at 812 n.5
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 80, cmt. c).
Jacobsen's dual litigation in Wyoming and Utah will try the exact same
facts. At the heart of this case is whether Teton Builders performed under Jacobsen's
Contract for improvements to the Property located in Wyoming. In any Wyoming action
on the Payment Bond, precisely the same facts will be tried, with possibly different
Based on the trial court record quoted in Prows, the trial court appeared to assume—
without taking relevant evidence—that Flying J was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New
York:
To require the plaintiff to go to New York to litigate where Flying J cannot be a
part of a lawsuit, because clearly you can't get Flying J there unless there's
personal jurisdiction on some basis we haven't talked about, then this entire issue
can't be resolved in one case, we're going to have to try part of it here, part of it
in New York, and that assuming the State of New York will take it.
868 P.2d at 812 (quoting trial court record) (emphasis supplied). Similarly, in the present case,
the record only reflects that FS Jackson Hole and US Fidelity are domiciled outside Utah. Since
there is no evidence that either entity is subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah, the Court can, as
in Prows, determine that dual litigation will likely result from enforcing the forum selection
clause—not to mention the dual litigation that has already resulted from Jacobsen's filing of two
separate actions.
12

outcomes. Permitting Jacobsen, a large general contractor found in multiple states, to
pursue such dual litigation effectively doubles the smaller Subcontractors' litigation
expenses. Subcontractors must retain lawyers in both Wyoming and Utah. Depositions
and other discovery must be performed in both Wyoming and Utah. Two separate trials
will be held over identical issues. Then, when the two cases are concluded, the parties
face the possibility of conflicting rulings from Utah and Wyoming courts on the same
claims or issues, which will lead to a morass of conflicting enforcement issues.
Such a result is unfair and unreasonable, and contravenes Utah's public
policy. As the plaintiff maintained in Prows, dual litigation over the same facts is
"chaotic and prohibitively expensive." 868 P.2d at 812. This Court should maintain the
public policy recognized in Prows and spare the parties the expense and uncertainty that
will likely result from two competing lawsuits by reversing the trial court's ruling
enforcing Jacobsen's forum selection clause. This will require the parties to pursue the
action in Wyoming, where the property is, among all of the parties and involving all
relevant claims arising from this Wyoming construction project. On remand, the trial
court should then be instructed to dismiss this action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

13

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN APPLYING HENDERSON
AND FINDING A RATIONAL NEXUS BASED SOLELY ON
JACOBSEN'S UTAH HEAD OFFICE.
Even if the forum selection clause is enforceable, the trial court still should

have dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court determined under the
"rational nexus" test of Phone Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256,
that a rational nexus with Utah exists in this case solely on the basis of Jacobsen's head
office being located in Utah.
The trial court erred in applying the "rational nexus" test for two reasons.
First, based on the plurality in Henderson, the "rational nexus" test only applies when
there is a consent-to-jurisdiction clause in the parties' contract. Since Jacobsen's
Contract did not contain any consent-to-jurisdiction clause, the trial court should have
applied the traditional minimum contacts analysis. Second, even if the "rational nexus"
test applied to this case—and it does not—there can be no rational nexus with Utah in an
action over improvements to real property located in Wyoming. There is no connection
to Utah at all, apart from plaintiffs Utah head office.
A.

Henderson Js "Rational Nexus" Test Only Applies When There is
a Consent-to-Jurisdiction Clause,

Based on the concurrences to the plurality opinion in Henderson, there is no
basis for even applying the Henderson "rational nexus" test in this case, which involves a
forum selection clause, but no consent-to-jurisdiction clause. On this basis, the Court
should reverse.

14

The Henderson Court examined a contract between a Utah-based plaintiff,
Phone Directories Co., and its defendant employee in California, Henderson. Phone
Directories Co. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64,ffif3-4, 8 P.3d 256. The parties' contract in
that case contained a forum—or venue—selection clause selecting Utah, along with a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause under which the parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction
of the Utah courts. Id. at t 7 & n.2.
The plaintiffs Utah office was not the only connection to Utah in
Henderson. There, Henderson visited Phone Directories' Utah offices, negotiated the
contract in Utah, and made numerous other contacts with plaintiffs Utah offices. Id. at f
16.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Durham observed that "a forum
selection/consent to jurisdiction clause by itself is not sufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over a defendant as a matter of law." IcL at f 14 (Durham, J., plurality
opinion). Rather, there must still be "a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the transactions that are the subject
matter of the contract." IcL This standard for personal jurisdiction is a lesser standard for
the plaintiff to meet than that required by the Due Process Clause and Utah's long-arm
statute—i.e., the minimum contacts analysis. See id. However, only Judge Bench
(sitting by designation) joined in the lead opinion.

15

Justice Wilkins (with Justice Russon) concurred in the result, writing that
personal jurisdiction was appropriate pursuant to the minimum contacts analysis, and that
there was no basis for creating a new test under the facts of Henderson. Id. at ^| 23
(Wilkins, J., concurring). Then-Chief-Justice Howe also concurred in the result of Justice
Durham's opinion, but only with respect to the enforceability of the forum selection
clause, which according to Justice Howe is determined by previous rulings of this Court.
Id. at f 20 (Howe, C.J., concurring). Justice Howe joined in Justice Durham's adoption
of a "rational nexus" test only with respect to the consent-to-jurisdiction clause. Id. at ^f
22 (Howe, C.J., concurring). In sum, based on the concurring opinions in Henderson, the
"rational nexus" test may only apply to forum selection clauses where there is also a
consent-to-jurisdiction clause.
In the instant case, the parties never bargained for a consent-to-jurisdiction
clause. There is no such clause in Jacobsen's Contract. [R.9-17.] Rather, Jacobsen's
Contract provides solely for venue in Utah. Contract at Tf 7(C) (Exhibit A, attached).
[R.16.] As a result, under Henderson, there is no basis for applying the "rational nexus"
test to the personal jurisdiction issue in this case. Rather, Jacobsen bears the burden of
establishing requisite minimum contacts, a burden which it has not met. Jacobsen has not
refuted that Subcontractors have no contacts at all with Utah, but instead assumed this
fact for purposes of Subcontractors' motion to dismiss. See Memorandum Opposing

16

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1. [R.62.] On this basis, there is no personal
jurisdiction and the Court should reverse.
B.

There Can Be No Rational Nexus Based Solely on the Plaintiffs
Domicile, Particularly When the Entire Action Is Based on
Improvements to Real Property Outside Utah.

Alternatively, even if Jacobsen's forum selection clause invoked the lesser
"rational nexus" test of Henderson (and it does not), Jacobsen cannot meet its burden of
showing a rational nexus in this case because all relevant factors militate in favor of
resolution in and are inseparably connected with Wyoming. The Henderson plurality
recognized that consent "by itself is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a
defendant as a matter of law." Id, at ^f 14 (plurality opinion). Rather, the plaintiff must
still establish "a rational nexus between this state and either the parties to or the subject
matter of the contract." Id. at ^} 15.
A sufficient rational nexus existed in Henderson, where the defendant at
least visited the plaintiffs Utah offices, negotiated the contract in Utah, and had
numerous contacts with plaintiffs Utah offices. 2000 UT 64 at ^ 16. According to at
least two Justices, these contacts were even sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts
analysis. Id at ^| 23 (Wilkins, J., concurring).
This action, in contrast, is a complete stranger to Utah. Subcontractors lack
any contacts at all with Utah. Jacobsen's form Contract was executed, negotiated, and
performed in Wyoming through Jacobsen's Wyoming office by Jacobsen's Wyomingbased personnel. Jacobsen's Contract provides for the construction of improvements on
17

real property located in Wyoming. Subcontractors are Wyoming residents with no
contacts whatsoever to Utah. Jacobsen's Contract designates that Wyoming law applies.
The single connection to Utah in this action is that Jacobsen is a Utah-based company,
even though Jacobsen acted in, maintained offices in and was itself a resident of
Wyoming.
By finding a rational nexus in this case, the court below stretched
Henderson to a most absurd end because, after its ruling, a Utah general contractor
plaintiff may require all of its construction disputes in sister states involving real property
in those states to be brought in Utah. Based on the trial court's ruling below, all that need
be shown is that the plaintiff is domiciled in Utah and nothing more; the Henderson rule
requiring consent to jurisdiction and some additional nexus is essentially rendered
meaningless. If the trial court's ruling is upheld, Henderson is useful only in cases where
none of the parties resided in Utah and where the contract was not entered into or to be
performed in this state. Rather than permit such a result, the Court should lend meaning
to Henderson by reversing the trial court's denial of Subcontractors' motion to dismiss
and concluding that there is no rational nexus with Utah in this case. Jacobsen may still
pursue its claims in its second action filed in Wyoming, whose courts are open to all
additional claims that can be brought with respect to the Property or the Payment Bond.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Subcontractors Teton Builders and Thomas
R. Hunter respectfully request that this Court reverse the trial court's order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand to the trial court with
instructions to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.
DATED this ~^° day of February, 2004.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

By:
R. Stephen Marshal
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Appellants Thomas R. Hunter
and Teton Builders
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MASTER SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT

Rev. 9/Q0
Agreement No.

1983

i AGREEMENT, made at Salt Lake City, Utah, as of the _ 3 j j L _ day of
June
20 ^ 2 _ by and between
3BSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., hereinafter referred to as Contractor, and
_^
Teton Builders 1200 Gregory Lane Jackson, WY 83QQ1
an independent contractor,
inafter referred to as Subcontractor. The term Subcontractor as used herein includes Subcontractor's suppliers and subcontractors,
{dings used in this Agreement are general in nature and have no legal effect This Master Subcontract Agreement (MSA) sets out
general rights and responsibilities of the parties hereto for work to be performed by Subcontractor on one or more future projects,
specific terms and conditions related to a specific project will be set out in a subsequently-executed Subcontractor Work Order
/O), the terms of which shall be deemed part of this Agreement.
For and in consideration of the covenants herein contained, Contractor and Subcontractor agree as follows:
-SCOPE OF WORK
General. Subcontractor shall furnish and pay for all supervision, labor, materials, tools, equipment, scaffolding,
templates, testing, permits, fees, etc. required to do and complete ail of the work set out in a SWO in strict accordance
with the Subcontract Documents which are: (1) this Agreement; (2) the Prime Contract which is, as used herein, the
agreement between Owner and Contractor and the contract documents related thereto,including General, Supplementary
and other Conditions of the contract, drawings, the project manual/specifications, Addenda per Paragraph 1C of a SWO,
change orders, construction directives or modifications to the Prime Contract issued subsequent to the execution of the
agreement between Owner and Contractor (whether before or after the execution of the applicable SWO), and any other
contract documents listed in the agreement between Owner and Contractor; (3) Change Authorizations or modifications
to a SWO issued by Contractor after execution of the applicable SWO; (4) any subsequently-issued SWO tied to this
Master Subcontract Agreement; and (5) other documents listed herein or in a SWO. The Subcontract Documents are as
fully a part of this Agreement as if attached hereto or repeated herein. Subcontractor may review relevant portions of the
Subcontract Documents at Contractor's main office with reasonable notice. Contractor and Subcontractor are hereby
strictly bound to each other by the terms and requirements of the Prime Contract insofar as those terms and requirements
are applicable to this Agreement and to the work to be done by Subcontractor. If anytafthe terms or requirements of the
Prime Contract are contradictory with any of the terms or requirements of this Agreement and/orthe applicable SWO, the
terms and conditions which place the highest duty and/or more stringent requirements upon Subcontractor shall govern
(e.g. Paragraph SQ). Any notation such as "by contractor" or "by general contractor" in the Subcontract Documents
connected with work which would, absent the notation, be the responsibility of Subcontractor per this Agreement, shall
be interpreted to read "by Subcontractor".
2.

PROSECUTION OF WORK, SAFETY, E.E.O., ETC.
A.

Commencement of Work/Execution of a SWO. A SWO shall not be binding upon the parties hereto unless the Prime
Contract related to the SWO is executed by the parties thereto and approval for Contractor to proceed under the Prime
Contract is given by Owner or its representative. If Subcontractor has received its copy of a SWO for signature and
thereafter works for more than five (5) work days "on site prior to signing the SWO, said work shall be deemed to be
acceptance by Subcontractor of the SWO in its entirety. By signing the SWO or, as noted herein, working on site,
Subcontractor represents that it has (1) visited and inspected the site of the work, and (2) carefully reviewed the
Subcontract Documents and is thus aware of any impact, relationship, or interference which the site, site conditions,
climate, construction sequence, Subcontract Documents, and/orthe work of other subcontractors or contractors will have
upon'Subcontractor's rights} duties, access, operations, efficiency, etc.

B,

Performance. Time is strictly of the essence of this Agreement Subcontractor therefore agrees: (i) to procure and
prepare its materials so as to be ready to begin work when directed by Contractor; (2) to plan, prosecute, and complete its
work in a prompt and diligent manner so as not to delay, disrupt, hinder or interfere with the work of Contractor or other
subcontractors; (3) to commence the several parts thereof at such times and proceed therewith in such order as may be
directed by Contractor; (4) to provide, at its expense, additional workers and/or to work on an overtime or shift basis
should Contractor reasonably so direct; (5) to do ail layout, cutting, fitting and patching of its work as may be required to
make its several parts come together properly and to fit it to receive or be received by the work of Contractor or other
subcontractors, ail as shown upon or reasonably implied by the Subcontract Documents; (6) to proceed in a skillful and
expeditious manner, with sufficient labor, materials, tools, equipment, and supplies; and (7) to complete the several pans
and the whole of said work as provided herein so thai, in conjunction with other subcontractors engaged thereon,
Subcontractor will insure the uninterrupted progress of the project and enable Contractor to complete the project as
scheduled by Contractor. Subconrractor and its employees will not participate in or honor any union picketing, stnke,
leafleting, slowdown, work stoppage, etc.
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C.

Schedules. For purposes of scheduling the work, Contractor may periodically deveLop and modify project schedule(s).
Contractor retains the right to modify said schedule(s), change work sequences and priorities, and to otherwise schedule
the work so as to achieve timely project completion and interim project milestone dates. Subcontractor agrees to adapt its
efforts and to meet Contractor's schedule(s) as modified without additional cost to Contractor and/or Owner.

D.

Time Extensions and Compensation Related Thereto. As between Contractor and Subcontractor, the time-for
Subcontractor's performance may be extended in writing at any time by Contractor. Subcontractor shall receive
compensation from Contractor for a delay but, only to the extent that Contractor receives compensation from Owner for
costs and/or damages incurred by Subcontractor as a result of said delay. Further, Subcontractor shall not be entitled
to either additional time or additional compensation related to delays unless written claim for same is received by
Contractor within seven (7) days of the commencement of a particular cause of delay. Any claim for additional
time related to a change in the work or changed conditions must be submitted with Subcontractor's pricing
information for said change (see Article 5). For delays and/or damages attributable to suppliers or other
subcontractors, see Paragraph 2G.

E.

Failure to Prosecute the Work/Insolvency, If Subcontractor shall at any time: (1) refuse or neglect to supply a sufficient
number of properly skilled workers or sufficient materials of the proper quality, or (2) fail in any respect to prosecute the
work with promptness, or (3) fail promptly to remove and replace work condemned by Owner, Architect or Contractor
and make good the work of others damaged by said replacement, or (4) cause by any action or omission the stoppage of,
delay of or interference with the work of Contractor or any other subcontractor, or (5) fail in the performance of any of
the material covenants of the Subcontract Documents, or (6) to be adjudged a bankrupt or make a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors, or (7) become insolvent or a debtor in reorganization, receivership, composition or arrangement
proceedings; then three (3) days after delivery of a written notice to Subcontractor indicating the existence of any of the
foregoing causes, and unless the cause specified in such notice is eliminated within such three (3) days, Contractor at its
option may provide, either by itself or through others, labor and materials to prosecute and complete the work and shall
deduct the cost thereof from any amounts then due or thereafter to become due to Subcontractor. In any such event, after
such notice and Subcontractor's failure to eliminate such cause within the three (3) days specified, Contractor may at its
option (and without prejudice to any other remedy Contractor may have) terminate all or part of this Agreement and a
related S WO "for cause" and, for the purpose of completing the work, take possession of all or part of the materials and
equipment of Subcontractor at the project site^ all of which Subcontractor hereby assigns to Contractor. Contractor may
then complete the work by whatever reasonable method Contractor deems expedient In case of such partial or total
termination for cause, Subcontractor shall not be entitled to receive any further payment until the work required by the
S WO is fully complete and accepted by Owner and Architect; and at such time, if the unpaid balance of the amount to be
paid hereunder exceeds Contractor's cost, such excess shall be paid by Contractor to Subcontractor, but if Contractor's
cost exceeds the unpaid balance, Subcontractor shall promptly pay the difference to Contractor. "Cost" as used in this
Paragraph 2E shall include: (1) Contractor's expenses incurred in taking over and completing Subcontractor's work, (2)
damages incurred by Contractor due to Subcontractor's non-performance, etc., and (3) reasonable charges for Contractor's
overhead and profit.

F.

Damages. If Subcontractor fails to prosecute the work as required in this Agreement and/or a SWO, Subcontractor shall
be liable for (1) either actual or liquidated damages per the Subcontract Documents to compensate Owner for its costs
related to Subcontractor's non-performance, and also (2) actual damages incurred by Contractor and its subcontractors
and suppliers related to Subcontractor's non-performance. Subcontractor's responsibility for such damages shall exist
regardless of whether Contractor elects to take over Subcontractor's work per Paragraph 2E. -Contractor and
Subcontractor shall not be liable to one another for any delays arising out of acts of God, strikes (except as described in
Paragraph 2B), or other causes explicitly determined to be beyond their control; except in the event that Owner assesses
damages or penalties against Contractor, then Subcontractor shall be responsible for such portion of said assessment as is
attributable to Subcontractor, regardless of the cause of delay.

G

Suppliers and Other Subcontractors. Subcontractor agrees that it has a duty to coordinate and communicate with
suppliers and other subcontractors on the project. Contractor shall not be liable to Subcontractor for any damages, loss or
expense resulting from acts or omissions (whether or not negligent), failure to perform, delays in performance, or defaults
of a suppjier or another subcontractor in connection with the performance of any of the work covered by the Prime
Contract and/or this Agreement and/or a SWO. Any claim or invoice of Subcontractor for such damages, loss or expense
shah be made and any action shall be filed, directly against said other party without making Owner or Contractor a party
to any action brought upon such claim. Subcontractor agrees that any project supplier or subcontractor shall have a direct
right of action against Subcontractor for damages, loss or expense resulting from Subcontractor's acts or omissions
(whether or not negligent), failure to perform, delays in performance, or default.

-

H.

Safety, Subcontractor agrees to provide its employees with safe tools, equipment, etc.; to provide them with a safe place
to work; to perform the work under this Agreement in a safe manner with high regard for the safety of its employees and
others; and to comply with prevailing safety regulations, whether federal, state, local or otherwise imposed. Whenever
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Subcontractor is working on the project, it shall have on site a competent safety representative who, in addition to his or
her other duties, shall be responsible for implementing and administering Subcontractor's safety program, including
consistent safety training of Subcontractor's employees and holding documented weekly jobsite safety meetings with its
employees. Contractor shall have the right (but not the duty) to review said documentation. Subcontractor shall
immediately remedy any unsafe conditions brought to its attention or discovered by Subcontractor involving its work
and/or posing a danger to persons or property. Subcontractor, on behalf of its employees, grants to Contractor the right
to periodically make random searches of vehicles on site, lunch boxes,-tool"boxes, etc. for controlled or prohibited
substances and/or stolen tools, materials, etc. Subcontractor shall not permit its employees'at the project to use publicly
audible radios or to wear head sets except as are used for job site communications. Subcontractors on-site employees
shall wear long or short sleeve shirts, long pants, sturdy shoes or boots, and hard hats (except when Subcontractor obtains
a written waiver from Contractor for specific areas of the project where hard hats are not required by governmental or
Owner safety regulations). Only certified model ANSI Z89.1-1986 class B conventional hardhats shall be worn. Bump
caps and hard hats without a rounded dome, such as cowboy hardhats, are not allowed. Subcontractor shall have on site a
first-aid kit adequate for the needs of its employees. Smoking or chewing of tobacco by Subcontractor's employees will
be permitted only in Contractor-designated areas. Prior to bringing on site a substance or material for which a Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) is- required by governmental regulations, Subcontractor shall provide said MSDS to
Contractor. Contractor shall provide temporary lighting for general access (e.g. corridors) and Subcontractor shall
provide all necessary task lighting in its work areas.
L

E.E.O./Affirmative Action/Wage-Hour Requirements. Subcontractor shall fully comply with wage-hour regulations and
shall take vigorous affirmative action to comply with E.E-O. and Affirmative Action Clauses 41 CFR 60-1.4,41 CFR 60250.4, and 41 CFR 60-741.4 as revised, amended or superseded whenever required by law or by the Subcontract
Documents, and is encouraged to do so in the absence of such requirement. Subcontractor shall also comply in all
respects with the terms for employment and payment of labor required by Owner and/or any constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the work.

J-

Fines. If Subcontractor's alleged acts or omissions result in a fine or penalty being levied against Contractor by any
lawful regulatory agency or court, then the amount so levied shall be for Subcontractor's account and may be deducted
from amounts otherwise due Subcontractor.

K.

Supervision/Authority. Subcontractor shall provide competent and continuous supervision of its work. Instructions
given by Contractor to Subcontractor's superintendent or foreman, and documents executed by and commitments made by
said superintendent or foreman shall be binding upon Subcontractor, Unless Subcontractor provides Contractor with a
list defining those employees who are authorized to sign for Subcontractor, any employee of Subcontractor who signs a
document for Subcontractor shall be deemed to be an authorized representative of Subcontractor. Said list must be sent
via certified U.S. mail, and shall become operative seven (7) days after it is received by Contractor.

L.

Progress Reports. Subcontractor shall furnish to Contractor periodic progress reports on Subcontractor's work as
reasonably requested, including information on the status'of materials and equipment which may be in the course of
preparation or manufacture.

M.

Acceptance of the Work of Others. Should the proper performance or appearance of Subcontractor's work depend
wholly or partially upon any work or materials furnished b"y Contractor or others, Subcontractor agrees to use all
reasonable means necessary to discover any relevant defects therein and report same in writing to Contractor before
proceeding with its work which is affected thereby and shall allow Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such
defects. In the event Subcontractor does not so report to Contractor in writing, then it shall be assumed that
Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and Subcontractor shall be fully responsible
thereafter for satisfactory performance of the work covered by this Agreement, regardless of the defective work of others.

N.

Incidental Charges, Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or a related SWO, reasonable amounts for unloading,
hoisting, clean- up, templates, layout or other services provided by Contractor for Subcontractor, and reasonable amounts
for Contractor's equipment, tools, etc. used by Subcontractor shall be deducted from amounts otherwise due
Subcontractor. Backcharge type charges for incidental extra work performed by one party at the request of the other
party, or for the benefit of the other party, or in the event of default by the other party shall be charged at actual field cost
plus a 15% charge for home office overhead and profit.

O.

Permits, Fees and Codes. Subcontractor shall, at its own cost and expense, pay all fees related to the execution of its
work; apply for and obtain all necessary permits, licenses, etc.; and conform strictly to the laws, building codes and
ordinances in force insofar as applicable to the work covered by a SWO.
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Subcontractor is working on the project, it shall have on site a competent safety representative who, in addition to his or
her other duties, shall be responsible for implementing and administering Subcontractor's safety program, including
consistent safety training of Subcontractor's employees and holding documented weekly jobsite safety meetings with its
employees. Contractor shall have the right (but not the duty) to-review said documentation. Subcontractor shall
immediately remedy any unsafe conditions brought to its attention or discovered by Subcontractor involving its work
and/or posing a danger to persons or property. Subcontractor, on behalf of its employees, grants to Contractor the right
to periodically make random searches of vehicles on site, lunch boxes, tool boxes, etc. for controlled or prohibited
substances and/or stolen tools, materials, etc. Subcontractor shallriotpermit its empfoyees at the project to use publicly
audible radios or to wear head sets except as are used for job site communications. Subcontractor's on-site employees
shall wear long or short sleeve shirts, long pants, sturdy shoes or boots, and hard hats (except when Subcontractor obtains
a written waiver from Contractor for specific areas of the project where hard hats are not required by governmental or
Owner safety regulations). Only certified model ANSI Z89.1-1986 class B conventional hardhats shall be worn. Bump
caps and hard hats without a rounded dome, such as cowboy hardhats, are not allowed. Subcontractor shall have on site a
first-aid kit adequate for the needs of its employees. Smoking or chewing of tobacco by-Subcontractor's employees will
be permitted only in Contractor-designated areas. Priorto bringing on site a substance or material for which a Material
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) is required by governmental regulations, Subcontractor shall provide said MSDS to
Contractor. Contractor shall provide.temporary lighting for general access (e.g. corridors) and Subcontractor shall
provide all necessary task lighting in its work areas.
I.

E.E.OVAffirmative Action/Wage-Hour Requirements. Subcontractor shall fully comply with wage-hour regulations and
shall take vigorous affirmative action to comply with E.E.O. and Affirmative Action Clauses 41 CFR 60-1.4,41 CFR 60250.4, and 41 CFR 60-741.4 as revised, amended or superseded whenever required by law or by the Subcontract
Documents, and is encouraged to do so in the absence of such requirement. Subcontractor shall also comply in ail
respects with the terms for employment and payment of labor required by Owner and/or any constituted authority having
legal jurisdiction over the work.

J.

Fines. If Subcontractor's alleged acts or omissions result in a fine or penalty being levied against Contractor by any
lawful regulatory agency or court, then the amount so levied shall be for Subcontractor's account and may be deducted
from amounts otherwise due Subcontractor.

K.

Supervision/Authority. Subcontractor shall provide competent and continuous supervision of its work. Instructions
given by Contractor to Subcontractor's superintendent or foreman, and documents executed by and commitments made by
said superintendent or foreman shall be binding upon Subcontractor. Unless Subcontractor provides Contractor with a
list defining those employees who are authorized to sign for Subcontractor, any employee of Subcontractor who signs a
document for Subcontractor shall be deemed to be an authorized representative of Subcontractor. Said list must be sent
via certified U.S. mail, and shall become operative seven (7) days after it is received by Contractor.

L.

Progress Reports. Subcontractor shall furnish to Contractor periodic progress reports on Subcontractor's work as
reasonably requested, including information on the status of materials and equipment which may be in the course of
preparation or manufacture.

M.

Acceptance of the Work of Others. Should the proper performance or appearance of Subcontractor's work depend
wholly or partially upon any work or materials furnished by Contractor or others, Subcontractor agrees to use all
reasonable means necessary to discover any relevant defects therein and report same in writing to Contractor before
proceeding with its work which is affected thereby and shall allow Contractor a reasonable time in which to remedy such
defects. In the event Subcontractor does not so report to Contractor in writing, then it shall be assumed that
Subcontractor has fully acceptedthe work of others as being satisfactory and Subcontractor shall be fully responsible
thereafter for satisfactory performance of the work covered by this Agreement, regardless of the defective work of others.

N.

Incidental Charges. Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or a related SWO, reasonable amounts for unloading,
hoisting, clean- up, templates, layout or other services provided by Contractor for Subcontractor, and reasonable amounts
for Contractor's equipment, tools, etc. used by Subcontractor shall be deducted from amounts otherwise due
Subcontractor. Backcharge type charges for incidental extra work performed by one party at the request of the other
party, or for the benefit of the other party, or in the event of default by the other party shall be charged at actual field cost
plus a 15% charge for home office overhead and profit.

0.

Permits, Fees and Codes. Subcontractor shall, at its own cost and expense, pay all fees related to the execution of its
work; apply for and obtain all necessary permits, licenses, etc.; and conform strictly to the laws, building codes and
ordinances in force insofar as applicable to the work covered by a SWO.
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P

IndeDendent Contractor/Taxes. Subcontractor represents and agrees that it is an independent contractor in fact and also
within the scope of the United States Internal Revenue Code; Social Security arid unemployment insurance laws and
regulations; applicable safety, health and environmental laws and regulations (e.g. OSHA, MSHA); and applicable
collective bargaining agreements and is solely responsible for: (1) its compliance with such laws, regulations, and
agreements, (2) all payroll taxes, and (3) all trust fund and other deductions, withholdings and contributions payable
under such laws, regulations and agreements. The contract amount includes all applicable sales and use taxes; franchise,
excise and other taxes; and governmental impositions of all kinds and is not subject to any addition for any such taxes or
impositions now or hereafter levied.

Q

G u ar an te e/Warranty.. During the guarantee (or warranty) period(s) established in the Subcontract Documents, and if no
such period(s) be therein stipulated, then for a period of one (1) year from date of total project completion, Subcontractor
agrees to promptly make good, solely at its expense, any work performed by Subcontractor which does not comply with
requirements of the Subcontract Documents (including defective installation work and/or materials) and all damage and
other losses resulting therefrom. • Subcontractor further agrees to provide, in writing, any guarantees, maintenance
agreements or other documents related to the work above described required "by the Subcontract Documents.
Subcontractor's responsibility for latent defects shall extend beyond the guarantee period to the maximum extent
applicable statutes permit.

INSURANCE AND DUTY TO DEFEND, INDEMNIFY & HOLD HARMLESS
A.

Certificates of Insurance. Prior to commencing its work on site and prior to receiving a payment otherwise due per this
Agreement or a SWO, Subcontractor shall furnish and thereafter maintain certificates of insurance and indemnification
evidencing compliance with (1) the indemnification provisions of Paragraph 3E, and (2) the insurance-related terms of
this Agreement and the applicable SWO. Said certificates of insurance and the policies represented thereby shall not be
cancelled or modified until thirty (30) days after written notice has been given to Contractor of such cancellation or
modification. Required coverages shall be maintained without interruption from the date Subcontractor commences work
under a SWO until at least the date of Subcontractor's receipt of final payment for the project. If the Subcontract
Documents require all or part of Subcontractor's insurance coverage to remain in force after completion and/or final
payment, a certificate evidencing continuation of such coverage shall be provided to Contractor prior to Subcontractor's
being entitled to final payment or payment of retainage.

B.

Worker's Compensation Insurance. Subcontractor shall provide and maintain Worker's Compensation insurance at the
levels required.by statute and Employer's Liability insurance with the following limits: (1) bodily injury by. accident,
5100,000 each accident; (2) bodily injury by'disease, S100,000 each employee; and (3) bodily injury by disease,
$500,000 policy limit.

C:

Liability Insurance. Subcontractor shall maintain such Commercial General Liability insurance, including automobile
and blanket contractual liability, as will protect Subcontractor from claims for damage because of bodily injury, including
death, or damage because of injury to or loss, destruction, or loss of use of propertyjwhich may arise from its operations
under this Agreement or a related SWO, whether such operations be by Subcontractor or its subcontractors or anyone
directly or indirectly employed by either of them. Subcontractor's liability insurance shall include Owner and Contractor
as additional named insureds. Subcontractor's insurance shall provide the minimum limits of coverage set out in
Paragraph IF of the SWO. Automobile Liability coverage shall be for all owned vehicles including non-owned, hired
liability. Commercial General Liability coverage shall be written on an occurrence basis rather than on a claims-made
basis.

D.

Builder's Risk Insurance and Waiver of Rights. Subcontractor shall satisfy itself as to the existence, coverage and
deductibles of Builder's Risk, Property and/or Equipment insurance prior to commencement of its work on a project.
Upon Subcontractor's written request, Contractor shall provide Subcontractor with a copy of the Builder's Risk insurance
policy and any other Property or Equipment insurance in force for a project if said insurance has been procured by
Contractor. Until final acceptance of a project by Owner, Subcontractor shall be responsible for (1) loss of or damage to
its stored and installed materials, and (2) its pro rata share of any deductible amount associated with an otherwise insured
loss. Contractor and Subcontractor waive all rights against each other and Owner, Architect, separate contractors, and
other subcontractors for loss or damage to the extent said loss or damage is covered by Builder's Risk or any other
Property or Equipment insurance, except such rights as they may have to the proceeds of such insurance. However,
unless the Subcontract Documents otherwise provide, such waiver shall not extend to the acts of .Architect arising out of
(1) the preparation or approval of maps, drawings, opinions, reports, surveys, change orders, designs or specifications or
(2) the giving of or the failure to give directions or instructions provided such giving or failure to give is the primary
cause of the loss or damage. If the policies of insurance referred to herein require an endorsement to provide for
continued coverage where there is a waiver of subrogation, the owners of such policies will cause them to be so endorsed.

E.
Duty to Indemnify. Defend and Hold Harmless. To the fullest extent permitted by law, Subcontractor shall indemnify,
TETON BUILDERS MSA# 1983
Page 4 of 8

defend and hold harmless Contractor and Owner from and against any and all claims, demands, damages, liabilities,
expenses and attorney fees (hereinafter collectively "loss") incurred by Contractor and/or Owner and arising out of,
allegedly arising out of, or in any way related to the performance of Subcontractor's work (or failure to perform said
work) includingbut not limited to: (1) loss incurred on account of any breach, or alleged breach, by Subcontractor of the
obligations and covenants of this Agreement or a related SWO; (2) loss incurred for injuries to, or death of, persons
including Contractor's employees, Subcontractor's employees and the employees of any other subcontractor, contractor,
independent contractor, property owner or their lessees or assigns, and the heirs and personal representatives of such
persons; (3) loss incurred arising from damage to real and/or personal property; (4) loss resulting directly or indirectly
from use by Subcontractor of any tools, equipment, facilities, materials or employees of Contractor, whether with or
without Contractor's knowledge or consentr(5)loss on account of the use of a bid depository or otherwise resulting from
awarding this work to Subcontractor. Subcontractor's duty to indemnify and defend set out herein absolutely obligates
Subcontractor to pay on behalf of Contractor and Owner all loss at such time as Contractor and/or Owner become legally
obligated to pay such loss on account of claims of any kind being made against them arising from, allegedly arising from
or in any way related to Subcontractor's performance or default under this Agreement or a related SWO including, but not
limited to, damages, judgements, settlements, costs, expenses and attorney fees. Upon written request of Contractor in
accordance with Subcontractor's obligations hereunder, Subcontractor shall further have the duty to defend and to pay all
costs and expenses incidental to any suit, arbitration, mediation or proceeding against Contractor and/or Owner arising
from, allegedly arising from or in any way related to, Subcontractor's performance or default under this Agreement or a
related SWO solely at Subcontractor's expense without any right or claim to reimbursement from Contractor and/or
Owner even if the allegations of the~su.it, arbitration, mediation, claim or proceeding prove to be groundless, false or
fraudulent. This indemnification in favor of Contractor and Owner is intended to provide Contractor and Owner with the
fullest indemnification permitted by law from any and ail losses whatsoever including, without limitations, attorneys'
fees, costs and expenses, related to, resulting from, or arising out of this Agreement or a related SWO.

4.

F.

No Limitation Upon Liability. In any claim against Contractor and/or Owner by any employee of Subcontractor, anyone
directly or indirectly employed by Subcontractor, or anyone for whose acts Subcontractor may be liable, the
indemnification, duty to defend and hold harmless obligations in this Agreement or a related SWO shall not be limited (1)
by any limitation on the amount or type of damages, compensation or benefits payable by or for Subcontractor under
worker's compensation, disability benefit or other employee benefit acts or regulations, or (2) to the policy limits of any
insurance coverage which Subcontractor maintains or is required to maintain.

G.

Prime Contract Requirements. If the Prime Contract requires of subcontractors broader coverage, defense,
indemnification, and/or hold harmless provisions; other named insureds; etc. than set out in this Article 3, then such
coverage, indemnification, etc. shall be provided and maintained by Subcontractor at no additional cost to Contractor.

PAYMENTS
A.

Cost Breakdown. Within thirty (30) days of the execution of the applicable SWO, Subcontractor shall submit for
Contractor's review and approval a detailed, true cost breakdown of the contract amount sufficiently itemized as to work
elements, labor, equipment, materials, etc. to allow Contractor to monitor Subcontractor's progress and to evaluate
Subcontractor's periodic billings. Subcontractor's overhead and profit shall be distributed on a pro rata basis to each line
item. The cost breakdown shall also include the estimated worker hours anticipated for each element of the work. An
intentionally distorted or misrepresented cost breakdown shall be deemed to be fraudulent.

B.

Billings/Payments. Contractor shall make, on account of the contract amount (adjusted by any Change Authorizations,),
monthly payments to Subcontractor for that portion of the work satisfactorily performed in the preceding month in
accordance with monthly billings prepared by Subcontractor and as approved by Contractor, Architect and Owner As an
absolute condition precedent to Subcontractor's being entitled to a particular payment, Contractor shall have received the
corresponding periodic payment from Owner including the approved portion of Subcontractor's monthly billing. In the
event Contractor does not receive from Subcontractor a proper and reasonable monthly billing prior to the date set forth
in Paragraph ID of the SWO, Contractor may include in its monthly billing to Owner such amount as Contractor shall
deem proper for the work of Subcontractor, and Subcontractor agrees to accept the approved portion thereof as its
monthly payment

C

Payments Withheld. Payments otherwise due Subcontractor, including payment of retainage and final payment, may be
withheld by Contractor on account of: (1) failure of Subcontractor to sign this Agreement or the applicable SWO, (2)
failure of Guarantor(s) to sign this Agreement or the applicable SWO if required, (3) failure of Subcontractor to provide
surety bonds \f required, (4) failure of Subcontractor to provide acceptabte and current certificates of insurance per
Paragraph 3A, (5) failure of Subcontractor to provide an acceptable cost breakdown per Paragraph 4A, (6) failure of
Subcontractor to complete Contractor's supplier affidavit and monthly lien release forms, (7) defective work of
Subcontractor not remedied, (8) failure of Subcontractor to make payments owing to its employees, suppliers or
subcontractors for material, services or labor, (9) claim(s) filed by or involving Subcontractor or reasonable evidence
indicating the probability of such a claim being filed, (10) failure of Subcontractor to perform per a schedule or
commitment made by Subcontractor, (11) failure of Subcontractor to perform per Contractor's schedule, or (12) a
TETON BUILDERS MSA#1983
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reasonable doubt that Subcontractor can complete its work for the contract amount then unpaid. If any of the foregoing
conditions exist and are not removed within three (3) days of Contractor's written notice to Subcontractor, Contractor
may rectify the same at Subcontractor's expense.

5.

D

Right to Offset/Joint Checks Contractor may offset against any sums due Subcontractor per this Agreement or a related
SWO any amounts which are, in Contractors good faith opinion, owed to Contractor (or others) by Subcontractor,
whether or not arising out of this Agreement or a related SWO and notwithstanding possible disputation by Subcontractor
of Contractor's opinion If an offset is disputed, it shall be dealt with per Paragraph 7C. Contractor may also, when it
deems proper m its sole discretion, issue joint checks to Subcontractor and Subcontractor's suppliers and subcontractors
Contractor's options set out in this Paragraph 4D confer absolutely no enforceable rights upon any third party

E

Implied Acceptance Payment to Subcontractor pursuant to monthly or final billings shall not constitute or imply
acceptance by Contractor, Architect or Owner of any portion of Subcontractor's work

F

Liens Subcontractor shall complete Contractor's monthly hen release and supplier affidavit forms Except for hens
arising out of Owner's failure to pay Contractor and Contractor's resultant non-payment of Subcontractor, Subcontractor
shall save and keep the project and improvements referred to in a SWO and the lands upon which they are situated free
from all hens and encumbrances arismg out of its work, including, but not limited to, mechanic's and materialmen's hens
If Subcontractor fails to remove any hen, by bonding xx otherwise, Contractor may retain sufficient funds out of any
amounts due or thereafter to become due from Contractor to Subcontractor to pay the same and all costs incurred by
reason thereof, and may pay said hen and costs out of any funds at any time in the hands of Contractor owing to
Subcontractor

G

Final Payment and Retainage The percentage of Subcontractor's approved monthly billings set forth in Paragraph IE of
the SWO and any other portion of the contract amount which is unpaid at the time of project completion shall be retained
by Contractor and absolutely shall not be paid to Subcontractor until: (1) Contractor determines that none of the
conditions set out in Paragraph 4C exist which would permit Contractor to withhold payment; (2) Contractor receives
final project payment from Owner, (3) Architect and Owner accept Subcontractor's work, guarantees, etc , (4)
Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with satisfactory evidence that all obligations incurred by Subcontractor pursuant to
the applicable SWO have been paid in full; (5) Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with consent of Subcontractor's surety
if any; (6) Subcontractor furnishes Contractor with consent of Guarantors if any, and (7) Subcontractor furnishes
Contractor with certificates of insurance evidencing extension of insurance coverage beyond final payment if required
(see Paragraph 3 A)

CHANGES IN THE WORK/CHANGED CONDITIONS
Contractor may add to or deduct from the work required by a SWO and any changes so made shall be defined by
Contractor's written Change Authorization setting forth the changes involved and the value and time impact thereof,
which value and time impact shall be mutually agreed upon between Contractor and Subcontractor and Owner if such be
possible, and if such mutual agreement is not possible, then the value and time impact shall be determined as provided in
Paragraph 7C of this Agreement In either event, Subcontractor agrees to proceed with the work as changed when so
ordered in wntmg by Contractor so as not to delay the progress of the work and pending determination of the value
thereof No claim for additional compensation, whether on account of extra labor and/or materials furnished, changed
conditions, or otherwise, shall be paid unless the same is furnished pursuant to a written order signed by Contractor
issued prior to the furnishing of the same Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with detailed pricing and tune
extension information for a proposed change in the work within seven (7) days of receipt of information regarding said
proposed change or within seven (7) days of receiving an instruction which Subcontractor believes constitutes a change whichever occurs first Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with detailed pricing and time extension information for
alleged changed conditions within seven (7) days of encountering alleged changed conditions Subcontractor shall not
be entitled to compensation or time extension for alleged changed conditions unless written claim for same is
received by Contractor within said seven (7) day period.

6.

SUSPENSION/TERMINATION
A

Suspension Contractor may, for its convenience or by direction, suspend the work, either in whole or in part, at any time
upon written notice to Subcontractor stating the nature, effective date and anticipated duration of such suspension
whereupon Subcontractor shall suspend its work to the extent specified and shall place no further orders or perform no
other work except as permitted by Contractor's notice of suspension During the period of such suspension
Subcontractor shall protect and care for all work, materials and equipment at the project site or at storage areas under its
responsibility The contract amount shall be adjusted as provided in Article 5 if the cost of the work is increased or
decreased by Change Authorization as a result of such suspension If additional time for completion of the work is
required as a result of such suspension, Subcontractor shall submit a written request for additional time m accordance
with Articles 2 and 5 Failure to submit a timely written request for additional time due to such suspension shall result in
TETON BUILDERS MSA# 1983
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no extension of time being granted.
3.

Termination for Convenience. In the event Contractor is directed by Owner to terminate all of its work prior to project
completion, then an equitable settlement for work performed under this Agreement prior to such termination will be made
as provided by the Subcontract Documents if such provision is made; or if none such exists, next by mutual agreement
(which agreement may be to arbitrate or litigate or compromise and settle); or, failing either of these methods, then as
provided in Paragraph 7C. In no event shall Subcontractor be entitled to prospective profits on unperformed work.

C

Termination for Cause. See Paragraph 2E.

DISPUTES

8.

A.

Scope of Prime Contract. In the event of a dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor with respect to whether the
Prime Contract, including drawings and specifications, requires Contractor (and thus, perhaps, Subcontractor) to furnish
any material or perform any labor, the decision of Architect shall be conclusive and binding. Should there be no architect
over the work, then the matter in question shall be resolved per Paragraph 7C.

B.

Subcontractor's Scope/Costs. In the event of a dispute between Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope or costs
of Subcontractor's work (e.g. whether Subcontractor is obligated to furnish certain items or to perform certain work
clearly required of Contractor by the Prime Contract), the dispute shall be settled in the manner provided by the Prime
Contract documents for settlement of such disputes. Should there be no manner of settlement so provided, the dispute
shall be resolved per Paragraph 7C.

C

Methods of Resolution. If there arises a claim or dispute concerning matters in connection with this Agreement or a
related S WO (for which dispute, provision for settlement is not otherwise made with the execution of the SWO), then the
claimant shall mail or deliver written notice of the claim to the other party within the time limits provided in the Prime
Contract or seven (7) days, whichever is shorter. Within thirty (30) days after mailing or delivery ofthe written notice of
claim, the claimant shall mail or deliver to the other party a written summary of all principal facts relating to the claim
and a detailed itemization, with substantiation, of the amount claimed. If Contractor is claimant, said
summary/itemization shall also contain a written election by the Contractor to either (a) pursue the matter through civil
litigation, or (b) submit the matter for binding arbitration. Said election shall bind both parties hereto. If Subcontractor
is claimant, within forty-five (45) days after receipt by Contractor of said summary/itemization, Contractor shall give
Subcontractor notice of Contractor's election to either litigate or arbitrate the matter. Said election shall bind both parties
hereto. If the election is to litigate, each of the parties hereto irrevocably waives the right to a trial by jury in any and all
actions or proceedings brought with respect to this Agreement and/or a related SWO or any provision thereof or the
enforceability thereof. If the election is to arbitrate, the arbitration shall be in accordance with the Construction Industry
Rules of the American Arbitration Association. No arbitration shall include by consolidation, joinder, or in any other
manner, parties other than Contractor, Subcontractor and any other person or entity substantially involved in a common
question of fact or law, whose presence is required if complete relief is to be accorded in the arbitration. The foregoing
agreement to arbitrate shall be specifically enforceable under applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof. All
arbitration proceedings and litigation shall take place within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Subcontractor shall carry
on its work and maintain its progress during any legal or arbitration proceedings.

D.

Recovery of Attorney Fees, Interest Etc. In the event it becomes necessary for either party to enforce the provisions of
this Agreement or a related SWO or to obtain redress for the breach or violation of any provision hereof, whether by
litigation, arbitration, or otherwise, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the other party all costs and
expenses associated with such action, including statutory interest and reasonable attorney fees except as limited herein.
Where Subcontractor is determined to be the prevailing party, Subcontractor shall not be entitled to recover said costs
and expenses (including attorney fees) if the final decision or judgment (excluding costs, expenses, attorney fees, and/or
interest which are incurred after Subcontractor's receipt of Contractor's last written offer) is less favorable to
Subcontractor than the last written offer of settlement from Contractor provided that said last written offer is made to
Subcontractor at least ten (10) days prior to the commencement of arbitration hearings or trial. Subcontractor shall have
five (5) days after receipt of such an offer to accept it in writing.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
A.

Bonds. If payment and performance bonds are required by Paragraph 1G of the SWO, Subcontractor shall furnish to
Contractor, at Subcontractor's expense, 100% payment and performance bonds guaranteeing the faithful performance of
this Agreement and the payment of all labor and material bills incurred in the execution of the work covered by this
Agreement and the applicable SWO. Notwithstanding any language to the contrary which may appear on the bonds
themselves, said bonds shall automatically extend and apply to all work performed pursuant to Change Authorizations, to
TETON BUILDERS MSA#1983
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Subcontractor's responsibility for actual and/or liquidated damages, tol to Subcontractor's guarantee/warranty
obligations. Bonds shall be written by a surety company acceptable to Contractor and in a form satisfactory to
Contractor.
B

Guarantors. If one or more Guarantors are required by Paragraph IH of the SWO, the Guarantors, in consideration of
Contractor's entering into the SWO, agree to be jointly and severally responsible with Subcontractor for Subcontractor's
performance of this Agreement and the SWO including Subcontractor's duty to Contractor and Owner to indemnify,
defend and hold harmless per Paragraph 3E. The obligations of each Guarantor shall be identical to the obligations
which a surety would have per Paragraph 8A.

C.

Subletting/Assignment. Subcontractor agrees not to transfer or sublet the work of a SWO or any part thereof without the
prior written consent of Contractor. Subcontractor's right to moneys due hereunder is non-assignable except with the
written consent of Contractor. Any assignment of moneys due hereunder made without such consent is void.

D.

Owner Approval/Contact. This Agreement and the SWO may be, per the Prime Contract, subject to approval of
Subcontractor by Architect and/or Owner, Notwithstanding the above, unless Contractor provides written permission,
Subcontractor shall have no direct dealings with Owner and shall not disclose to Owner any of the provisions or terms of
this Agreement or die applicable SWO.

E.

Entire Agreement/Third Parties/Modifications, All verbal or written terms, conditions, proposals,. opinions,
representations, negotiations and agreements made prior to the date of this Agreement are hereby expressly voided. This
Agreement and separately executed SWO's shall be the sole agreements between the parties- They shall be binding
upon the heirs, administrators, executors, successors and assigns of the parties hereto. Except as specifically prescribed
herein, this Agreement and a SWO shall not create any rights of, or confer benefits upon, third parties. Except for routine
Change Authorizations, no modification or change of the terms of this Agreement or a SWO shall be binding on
Contractor unless approved in writing by an officer thereof

F.

Notice. Any notice required to be given to a party hereto shall be directed to such party and mailed by certified mail, or
sent via electronic facsimile machine (fax), or personally delivered. Unless otherwise noted in this Agreement or the
applicable SWO, such notice shall be effective at the time received at the street address indicated herein of such party.
Notice received via fax after 5:00pm on a business day shall be effective at 9:00am on the next business day. Notice
received via fa^c before 9:00am on a business day shall be effective at 9:00am that same day. Notice received via fax on a
holiday or weekend shall be effective at 9:00am on the first business day thereafter.

G.

Nonenforcement Not a Waiver. Failure on the part of either party to exercise its rights under the provisions of this
Agreement or a SWO for any breach of the provisions therein by the other shall not constitute a waiver of such rights for
any subsequent breach of any provision therein.

H.

Severability. Any provision of this Agreement or a SWO determined to be in violation of any law applicable thereto shall
be void but that shall not affect the validity and enforceability of all other provisions therein.

I.

Governing Law. This Agreement and the applicable SWO shall be deemed to have been made in and shall be interpreted
under the laws of the place where the project is located.
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SUBCONTRACT WORK ORDER

\n<-

"SUBCONTRACTOR

PROJECT NAME

Teton Builders
1200 Gregory Lane
: Jackson, CVYS30QI

Four Seasons - Jackson Hole, Wyoming

JCC JOB NO

DArE

01066
. . . . VvORK
. . ORDEK
01066-27

MSA NO.

May 3, 2002

Ph. (307) 733-1143 fax: (307) 733-2028

MASTER TERMS

"

l

^C

j

GENT-.RAL DESCRIPTION OF WORJC TO SE PERfORMRD BV MJHCONTRACT0R

-Rough Carpentry-

The terms and conditions of the Master Subcontract Agreement (MSA) dated 3rd of
Juoe> 2001_ between Contractor and Subcontractor shall govern this Work Order and aie
folly incorporated herein by reference.

"Contractor" per the MSA is Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., 3131 West 2210 S o u f t ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ ^ I ^ r r )
841 !9. Subcontractor shall perform ihe work required by thi.s Subcontract Work Order in accordance with the
following:
jyN )02002
BASIC I N F O R M A T I O N
A.

B.

Jaooosei Construction

Four Seasons Resort
Project,
Jackson Hole. Wyoming
Project LocaUun; __
PS Jackson Hole Development Company, LLC
Owner:
..
Architect (or Engineer):
Hill-Glazier
,
w _,
Contract amount 1
One million one hundred four thousand nine hundred seventy six
LtQ4.976.00
^Dollar* (J,
. through and including,

C.

Addenda:

D-

Day of each month by which Subcontractor's monthly billing is to be received by Contractor: 20th

E.

Retainage: 10

F.

Liability insurance minimum limits (See Paragraph 3C of MSA)
Commercial General Liability, Occurrence and in the Aggregate $ LOOO.QQQ per occurrence
S 2.000.000 aggre^at?
Automobile Liability
S 1,000,000

G.

Payment and performance bonds are (check one):
Required (See Paragraph 8A of MSA)
X _ ^ o t Required (Paragraph 8A of MSA does not apply to this Agreement)

H.

Guarantors) are (check one):
X
Required (See Paragraph 8B of MSA), Guarantors shall be:
Not required (Paragraph 8B of MSA does not apply to this Work Order)

r.

Certified payrolls from Subcontractor are (check one):

j.

Shop drawings, etc. (check one):
X
Complete shop drawings, catalog cuLs, samples, etc. shall be submitted in JL copies with I
reproducible of shop drawings 10 7650 Granite Loop Road. Teton village. Jackson. Wyoming 83025
Project Site no later than
as soon as possible.

Rev 9/00

• N/A

N/A

% of Subcontractor's approved monthly billings

^Required

X

_Nor required

|

!

Not required
K.

Drawings and specifications applicable hereto are (check one):
Listed in the Subcontract Documents
M
X
Listed in Exhibit ' L C* attached hereto

L.

Jacobsen information
Project No, 0166
Code ^ 06100-5
Contractor's License No./State
N/A - Wyoming
Mailing Address
7650 Granite Loop Road. Tetofl Village. Jackson. WY 83025
_
Street Address
same as above
.
^ ^.^
a
Phones; Office 307-734-7157
Office f a x 307-739-2123
Project
307-734-0533
E-mail Address:
to be provided

M.

Subcontractor information
Organization (check one):

Corporation
X
Partnership
Individual
Joint Venture
Federal Tax Identification No,
Contact Person Tom Hunter
Status: Small Business
FBE
MBE.
.
Contractor's License No./State
N/A - Wyoming
Phone*' Office H ( m 733-1143 Office Fax: (301) 733-2028 E-mail Address:,

N.

^

Clean-up and trash removal
Subcontractor is responsible for regular and prompt clean up of all debris and rubbish occasioned by its
work. Subcontractor shall transport all such debris and rubbish to (check one):
An off-site disposal site selected and paid for by Subcontractor.
Contractor's on-site dumpster. Subcontractor shall pay its pro rata share of the costs of the
dumpster and dump fees.
Contractor's on-site dumpster. Contractor shall pay the COSTS of the dumpster and dump fees
t X
In addition, Contractor may periodically organize a general project clean-up. If Subcontractor is then
working on site, Subcontractor shall provide its pro rata share of labor to assist in said clean-up

Z,

SPECIFIC SCOPE OF W O R K

Perform all work required by and in accordance with the Subcontract Documents which include but arc not necessarily
limited to the Drawings titled % Tour Seasons Resort Jackson Hole, Wyoming", prepared by Hill glazier Aichitects,
particularly General Conditions, Supplementary General Conditions and Specification Sections:
Division I —General Requirements
Sections - All (As they relate to the performance of this Subcontract)
Specification Sections
06070 - Wood Treatment (As it relates to the performance of this Subcontract)
06100 - Rough Carpentry
06101 - Miscellaneous Carpentry (As it relates to the performance of this Subcontract)
06170 - Prefabricated Structural Wood
06192 -Prefabricated Structural Wood Trusses
A.

S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s scope of w o r k Includes, b u t is not limited to the following items:
1.

The word '"provide" is intended to be inclusive to furnish, fabricate, receive, unload, store, install, erscc,
etc. such that the material or system is complete and operational and is in its permanent location (eady
to be accepted and used by the Owner.

Teion Builders SWOf^O 1066-27
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2.

Subcontractor shall he aware that the Owner is expecting the finished project to be high quality in
appearance, workmanship, durability, and other such considerations. Subcontractor shall use such
measures as to obtain the desired outcome.

3.

Provide coordination with other subcontractors whose work abuts the work contained herein.

4

Provide all labor, materials, equipment and fasteners for rough framing of the Condominium Structure
- Area 06. It ib the intent of this work scope to provide all rough carpentry labor and materials as
required to successfully complete the 4-way inspection.

5

Provide species and grade of lumber as identified in the construciion documents, Drywall finishes will
require a Level 05 Finish and the rough carpentry scope of work will be a factor in achieving this level
of finish.

6.

Supply all marerials for a complete installation including, dimensional lumber, sheathing, gluelaminated beams, parallam beams, "V* joists, micro lam, rim boards, timbers, etc. for a complete
installation.

7.

Provide all hoisting required for the installation and erection of all rough carpentry work, inclusive of
fork lifts as required

8.

Supply and install ail nails, glue, hardware, specialty hardware, etc., for the rough carpentry scope of
work, as required by local codes and as indicated on the Contract Documents including inclusive of
Simpson hangers, straps* h u m cane clips 7 clips, saddles, etc.

9

Provide all framing associated with the stair* including treads and risers. Finished wood treads and
balustrades will be provided and installed by others.

10,

Provide installation of the exterior deck structures. Finished decking is by others.

11

Provide cleanup of structure on a regular basis. Deposit debris and waste materials in the Construction
Manager provided dumpstcr.
The rough carpentry scope of work is inclusive of the structural framing and includes the installation oi
exterior and interior wood framed walls, wall sheathing, floor joists, floor sheathing, roof trusses, stick
built roof systems, roof overbuilds, roof sheathing, blocking, fascias, curved roof edges, structural
timbers, timber trusses, plates, headers, beams, biair construction, attic access installation, draft stops,
etc
Provide the framing as required for the construction of the chimneys; refer to details AB-8.2 1 1 8, AB8 2 U 8 A , a n d AB-3 2 118B.

12,

13
14

install board and batten siding, trim materials, and exterior building paper at the shared wall on grid 158
and 160 between grid 135 and - I 117 refer to elevation 1 4 o n A 5 . l 0 . Refer to details on AB 8.4 33 for
the installation requirements of siding materials.

15

Install the through wall flashing material inclusive of all blocking materials; refer to details 2/AB8 A 5 4 , l/AB-8.4,56, 1/AB-8A56,

16,

The cost of the roof trusses is noted as a cash allowance below and will be adjusted based on the fina
cost from the supplier. Overhead and profit for this line item is included in the overall contract amount
and shall not be added to this line item.

17

The bridge connecting area 04 and area 06/will be coordinated with Teton Ruiiders erection schedule

"eton Builders SWO^O 1066-27
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:c
Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc.

JACKSON FOUR SEASONS PROJECT
Attachment D to Work Order # 01066-27

1. Teton Builders schedule requirements are predicated upon material delivery
dates. The erection schedule will be based upon original building durations
provided at time of bid, but will begin upon material delivery dates.
2. Jacobsen agrees to hold erection of the bridge between areas 4 and 6 until a
mutually agreeable time that will allow Teton Builders access to their work area.
3. Material delivered off site and paid for with project funds will become the property
of the owner. Off site stored materials will be paid for with the following
conditions:
a. Teton Builders to provide an affidavit stating that all materials were
purchased for the sole purpose of use on the Four Seasons resort and will
not be used for any other purpose.
b. Teton Builders will provide a certificate of insurance on the stored
materials.
c. Fee will not be assessed on stored materials. Fee may only be charged
against materials on site.
d. Copies of purchase agreements, invoices and delivery tickets must be
provided to Jacobsen Construction.
4. The cash allowance of $75,000 for roof trusses includes all delivery fees, taxes,
and transportation costs, F.O.B. jobsite,
5. This SWO applies only to Area 6 of the Four Seasons Resort.
6. Jacobsen shall provide level 6 Top of Concrete elevations and Grid lines.
7. Gypsum board is by others.
8

Jacobsen Construction shall make provide assistance with cranes on a limited
basis. Crane time must be coordinated with Jacobsep a minimum of 24 hours
prior.

VV1^

B.

The Contract a m o u n t w a s derived as follows:
Base Bid
Proposal Dated April 26, 2002
Rough Carpeiwy Materials
Roof Trusses (Allowance)
Wood I Joists
Glue Lams
LVL's or Parallam Beams
Hardware
Rough Carpentry Labor
Labor to install siding at shared wall
Total C o n t r a c t Amount

C.

3.

$$
S
$
S
S
$

379,804
75,000
55,288
42,612
26,974
42,658
472,640

S

10.000

SI ,104£1&

The following items will be provided by others:
1.
One set of the construction drawings and project manual as prepared by Hill Glazier Architects
Subcontractor will be required to purchase any additional sets of drawings and project manuals needed
to perform its scope of work.
2.

Others will provide embedded anchor bolts in concrete foundations.

j

Wood To steel specialty connectors at the moment frames will be provided by others

4

Others will supply the board and batten siding, trim, and waterproof membrane at the shared wall on
grid 158 and 160 between grid 135 and -i 11, refer to elevation 14 on A5.10 Co-ordination accepting
offloading and distribution to the final installation shall be by Seoul Enterprises

5

Others will supply the through wall flashing material

6

Exterior Timbers, siding, fascia boaids, and trim as noted on the architectural drawings

7

Others will perform installation of doors and windows.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS
1.

The amount of any additive change order (Change Authorization) to the Contract Amount will be limited to
the actual, direct cost to the Subcontractor of making that change plu<> a combined total of fifteen percent
(15%) of such actual cost of the Subcontractor's overhead and profit.

2

Subcontractor shall use reasonable efforts to avoid labor disputes that could hamper or delay the completion
of the work. Whether or not resulting from Subcontractor's failure to use reasonable efforts to avoid same,
in no event shall a labor dispute (other than an industry-wide/regional labor problem) give n s e t o a claim by
Subcontractor for an increase m the Contract Amount.

3.

Subcontractor shall furnish to any and all lenders providing funds for the construction or permanent
financing of the Project with such documents, instruments and certificates as may reasonably be required by
lenders in a form acceptable to lenders with respect to the construction of the Project and the payment of the
costs thereof

4,

Subcontractor shall bear the cost (wUhour reimbursement) resulting from the act or omission, or the fault or
negligence or failure to fulfill a specific responsibility of the Subcontractor and its agents or employees, or
anyone directly or indirectly employed by them or for whose acts any of them may be liable including but
not hmxted to costs for the correction of damaged, defective or nonconforming work, disposal and
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replacement of materials and equipment incorrectly ordered of supplied, and making good damage to
property not forming part of the work5.

in the event that the Contractor defaults under this Subcontract Work Order of the applicable Master
Subcontract Agreement or in the event that the Contractor is replaced by the Owner or the Owner's
construction lender as the Contractor for the project covered by this Subconrract Work'Order, at the request
and option of the Owner or the Owner's construction lender, Subcontractor will perform under and in
accordance with the terms of this Subcontract Work Order and applicable Master Subcontract Agreement
for any replacement Contractor. None of these provisions shall be construed to impose on Owner or the
Owner's construction lender any obligation with respect to the Subcontractor whatsoever.

6.

This Subcontract Work Order and Subcontractor bonds, if any, may be assigned to Owner and/or the lender,
in their sole discretion, in the event of the termination of the contract between the Owner and Contractor.

7.

Unless otherwise required by the Contract Documents, the form of warranty shown in Exhibit "A" shall be
used on this Project.

8.

Subcontractor shall connect and coordinate the Subcontractor's construction and operations with the
Owner's FF&E contractors as required by the contract documents.

9.

Contractor shall nor be obligated to make payment to Subcontractor with respect to any Application for
Payment unless:
a. Subcontractor delivers to Contractor concurrently with such Application for Payment,
conditional or unconditional, as applicable, lien waivers and releases in form substantially
similar to the forms attached hereto as Exhibit ^B", and
b, Subcontractor shall provide Contractor with reasonable evidence that Subcontractor has
complied with the following conditions to payment:
i, Subcontractor has attached to such lien waiver a full and complete list of the names and addresses of
all Subcontractors, Sub-subcontractors, material suppliers (and their respective Subcontractors, Subsubcontractors and material suppliers) (collectively, the ^Subs 77 ) which Subcontractor or any ot theSubs has hired to perform any portion of the Work or to provide any of the materials or equipment to be
used in connection with performing any portion of the Work (the "'List of Subs"),
it. Subcontractor has included a provision in each Subcontract and purchase order pertaining to the
Work and/or the Project which requires each of the Subs to notify Subcontractor of the names and
addresses of each of the Subs they have hired to perform any portion of the Work or to provide any of
the materials or equipment to be used in connection with performing any portion of the Work and
Subcontractor has incorporated ihe information so provided by each of the Subs into its List of Subs,
iii. Subcontractor has paid all of the Subs for all work performed and materials and equipment
provided (both on-site and off-site), except as expressly noted to the contrary,
iv. Subcontractor has required each of the Subs to provide conditional mechanic's lien waivers and
releases, in form and substance satisfactory to Contractor, Owner and Lenders, relating to that portion
of the Work for which the Application for Payment (to which the lien waiver and certification ib
attached) is being submitted and each of the Subs' conditional lien waivers are attached to
Subcontractor's hen waiver, and
v. Subcontractor has required each of the Subs to provide unconditional mechanic's lien waivers and
releases, in form and substance satisfactory to Contractor, Owner and Lenders, relating to that portion
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of the Work for which all prior progress payments were received and each of che Sub's unconditional
lien waivers are attached to'Contractor's Hen waiver.
10.

Subcontractor understands and acknowledges that, while this subcontract will be construed pursuant to the
laws of Wyoming, the underlying contract between the Contractor and the Owner is governed instead by
the laws of California and includes specific provisions for the resolution of disputes in that state.
Subcontractor may, bur is not required to, appear and participate to the extent allowed by California law in
any dispute between Jacobsen and the Owner that involves the performance of, or amounts due to
Subcontractor, Recognizing that the underlying contract governed by the laws of California, Subcontractor
agrees to accept and be bound by the final resolution of any such dispute whether or not Subcontractor
eleccs to participate therein.

1 i.

All policies of insurance required under the terms of this Subcontract Work Order and Master Subcontract
Agreement shall name Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc., FS Jackson Hole Development Company,
LLC, Louis Dreyfus Properties, LLC, Louis Dreyfus Property Group, Inc., Four Seasons HoteU and
Resorts, Jackson Hole Mountain Resort, The Robert Green Company and their respective members,
managers, partners, officers, directors, affiliates, agents, independent contractors, employees, successors
and assignees as additional insureds using ISO additional insured endorsement CG 20 10 or a substitute
providing equivalent coverage and shall contain a waiver of subrogation in favorof Owner, Owner's lender,
The Robert Green Company and their respective members, managers, partners, directors, officers, affiliates,
agents, independent contractors, emptoyees, successors and assignees. In addition, all such policies shall be
primary and non-contributing and shall contain an agreement on the part of the insurers that in the event ot
cancellation of the policy, or a reduction as to coverage or limits thereunder, whether initiated by the insurer
or arty insured, the insurer shall give not less than thirty (30) days advance written notice by registered or
certified mail to Owner and Contractor.

12.

The Subcontractor shall be required ro provide adequate forces to meet the schedule. The subcontractor
will be required to provide labor as required and shall be responsible for costs associated with working
beyond a standard 40 hour work week, if required. Subcontractors shall provide adequate materials and
crew to maintain schedule. Subcontractor shall be responsible for damages due to schedule delay
attributable to the Subcontractor. The Owner will assess liquidated Damages if the entire project is not
completed on schedule. Subcontractor's portion of the liquidated damages, if assessed, will be
commensurate to the degree in which it caused the delay to the project.

13.

Subcontractor shall schedule delivery of construction materials to avoid peak traffic periods, Peak traffic
periods are between the hours of 8:30a.m. - 9:30 a.m. and between 3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p,m

14.

On site parking will be limited, therefore van-pooling or car-pooling will be required by the Subcontractors
performing work on the site* Construction parking will be prohibited in the Village common lots, or in the
sunounding neighborhoods. Parking will be permitted at Stilson Ranch Lot/ US 22 and Wyoming 390
Shuttle to and from the site will be provided by the Contractor,

15.

This work will b<* phased. Subcontractor shall conform to the construction-phasing schedule as outlined in
the Construction Documents. Owner will occupy portions of the building during the construction period, as
outlined in the documents.

16.

Subcontractor shall verify dimensions as shown on the Drawings and field verify as required to insure
proper performance of its work. Subcontractor shall be responsible for all coring, cutting, patching, sealing,
caulking and finishing necessary to complete its work. Subcontractor shall protect nearby landscaping,
equipment, and finishes from damage caused by its operations. Any damaged areas shall be repaired or
replaced as directed by the Contractor at Subcontractors expense,

17

The Subcontractor shall provide the following prior to Substantial Completion:
i. Two sets of as built drawings.
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ii. Two framed valve charts listing each valve by number, system and function.
18.

Three months prior to substantial completion the Contractor will provide the following to the Owner,
therefore the Subcontractor shall provide the following in a timely matter to the Contractor for submission,
ill. Two sets of operating and maintenance manuals for all mechanical and electrical equipment
iv. Two sets of manufacturers recommended maintenance procedures for all architectural and
interior design materials.

19

All personnel of the subcontractor, which will be performing work on the site, shall attend an orientation
meeting organized by the contractor's on site personnel prior to performing work on the site.
Jacobsen Obstruction Compan^Jnc.
Contiactc

Teton Builders
Subcontract*)

/fas. 6-/O~CZL^S&u^ JL\

Signature/Title/Date
.*W*c££ £~

istributioTi: White/Subcontractor, Yellow/Accounting
lue/Project Office, Green/Control

Guarantor p£f faragr^fs 1H and 8B of MS A

S ignaturc/Tit le/Date

.£sl* -C<L

Guarantor's Address of Record.

Guarantor per Paragraphs 1H and 8B ot MSA
By:
Signature/Title/Date
Guarantor's Address of Record:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Appellate Case No. 20030727-SC
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MOTION TO DISMISS AUGUST 8,2003
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER

CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
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Sandy, Utah 84092
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

MATTHEW J. BALL
ATTORNEY AT LAW

For the Defendant:

ERIK A. OLSON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
* * *

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - AUGUST 8, 2003

2

HONORABLE ROBERT K. HILDER, JUDGE PRESIDING

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT: This is Teton Builders and Thomas Hunter,
case number 030905324.

Counsel, please state appearances.

MR. OLSON: Good morning, Your Honor, Erik Olson for
the defendants.
MR. BALL: Your Honor, Matt Ball for Jacobsen
Construction Company and this is Richard Kirkham, the Chief

10

Financial Officer of Jacobsen Construction.

11

THE COURT: Good morning.

12

Okay.

We are here on the Defendant's Motion to

13

Dismiss based on, I guess it's lack of jurisdiction and the

14

main defense is the contract, the form selection clause. Sort

15 J of enjoyable reading your memoranda.

I read them very

16

carefully, as well as the, mainly the Phone

Directories

17

and I have to say I, I just wondered if this is a continuation

18

of the battle between you two officers to style new phone

19

directories, at least the names in there look very familiar.

20

But that's been going on for, but it also explained to me why

21

you knew it so well.

22

up and I understand why you did, but it's certainly an

23

illustration of why it's so hard to deal with those fractioned

24

decisions.

case

I should say you really carved that case

I did find that frustrating in a way.

I know the

25 I Court gives you all the guidance it can, but when you got to

1

start pausing them the way you do that in that phone

2

directories case to figure out what the priority or majority

3

is, it gets difficult to say the least.

4

the motion, and it's your motion if I'm reading correctly, Mr.

5

Ball?

But I think on the,

6

MR. BALL: No, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT: No, I'm reversing it?

8

MR. OLSON: It's, right, it's mine.

9

THE COURT: Okay.

10

case.

11

parties.

12

I do that a lot.

I don't know what it is about this

I had reversed the firms for some reason.

I know the

My apologies on that.
On your motion, Mr. Olson, you don't spend a lot of

13

time initially on the, on the basic jurisdiction issues and

14

this is not a general jurisdiction.

15

minimum contacts nexus case.

16

that, you know, this doesn't really count because of the

17

contract, you do come back and analyze that.

18

contract is just absolutely critical and, of course, it is the

19

choice of law is critical, and it's sort of interesting to me

20

as we try to apply Wyoming law, but we keep coming back to Utah

21

law to interpret Wyoming law, particularly on the issue of

22

whether the form selection clause is unreasonable.

23

tell you, I'm leaning that the form selection clause is enough.

24

But I'm by no means all the way there, and that's partly

25

because of the language of their long arm and the interest of

This would have to be

But when Mr. Ball makes his point

But I think this

But I'll

1

the State in exerting jurisdiction as far as the constitution,

2

due process clause permits, and one question I have is why

3

doesn't due process, why isn't it satisfied if someone makes a

4

decision, even in something as limited as a form selection

5

clause, even without a consent to jurisdiction?

6

you guys start dividing form selection and consent to

7

jurisdiction, I really think we're slicing it thin, but I

8

understand the legal argument, and I respect the schooling

9

role.

10
11

And boy when

But why doesn't that deal with the constitutional

concern?
And the other concern is essentially the relationship

12

that's argued between the parties and all subject matter that

13

must exist, because the form selection clause alone is not

14

enough as Justice Durham said.

15

says it'd have to be both parties, Mr. Olson, the way the

16

language reads.

17

one point you made?

I think it's, your argument

It says parties in the plural, correct, that's

18

MR. OLSON: Sort of.

19

THE COURT: Yeah, and I'm just giving you this

20

background so that you can focus on the things that are

21

concerning me.

22

I can explain that a little.

I'm not sure that that's very persuasive because if

23

it was both parties, in all cases, you wouldn't often have much

24

of a dispute over form to start with.

25

to be here in the first place, or there, wherever it is.

Probably wouldn't want
So, I

1

think it's reasonable to read it as either the subject matter

2

or one of the parties to the contrary.

3

The other thing, finally, that's not all that you

4

want to argue I'm sure, but on issue of Wyoming law, in terms

5

of construing whether it's form selection or consent to

6

jurisdiction in a contract under Wyoming law do you still need

7

minimum contacts?

8

people are stuck with the contract.

9

the Wyoming law on that topic, but I suspect it is, which is

I think the closest analysis I saw was
I don't know if that's all

10

why I thought I saw, or maybe I missed it as it got to be about

11

11:00 last night.

12

I hope I didn't.

Before we start, Mr. Peterson, you have the whole

13

9:00 calendar.

I'm hearing an argument on a jurisdiction

14

matter.

15

move around and deal with them.

I will not be disturbed at all if you call people and
So -

16

MR. PETERSON: Thank you very much.

17

THE COURT: - please don't hesitate, okay?

18

Go ahead Mr. Olson.

19

MR. OLSON: Thanks, Your Honor, it sounds like I have

20

an up hill battle.

21

resolve the Court's concern -

22

Thank you.

But I'm confident that I'll be able to

THE COURT: It's always interesting and I don't know

23 I if you do or not, but, I mean, yeah you do, but it's so well
24
25

presented on both sides, I'm looking forward to your argument.
MR. OLSON: I appreciate that, thanks, Your Honor.

1

What I would first like to do is explain what Utah

2

law says.

There's been some confusion about that.

3

participate in, in the Phone

4

fully understand the Supreme Court's decision, and all of the,

5

all of the different opinions that were handed down in that

6

case, but I would like to go through that case and go through

7

some of the other standards that Utah has set forth in this

8

type of case.

9

that there is no jurisdiction in this case and I'll explain

Directories

case.

I did

I can't say I

When we look at these standards, it is certain

10

that.

The Court's already started with the general proposition

11

that, that we know is the case, that in Utah to establish

12

personal jurisdiction you have to go through the traditional

13

minimum contacts analysis.

14

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

15

MR. OLSON: Consistent with the due process clause and

16

the State long arm statute.

17

case, and it's the Phone

18

create any sort of exception to that traditional minimum

19

contacts analysis and that's what it is.

20

the standard rule.

21

nexus test that applies when there is a consent to jurisdiction

22

clause.

23

We are only aware of one Utah

Directories,

In Phone

Directories

Henderson

case that

It is an exception to
we have this rational

Now it, it has to be pointed out that based on the

24 I concurrences in that case, the exception to the minimum
25

contacts analysis does not extend, explicitly at least, by that

1

opinion to form selection clauses.

Based on Justice Howe's

2

concurrence where he stated that the enforceability of a form

3 I selection clause is still governed by other rulings that the
4

Supreme Court has handed down, which had nothing to do with

5

personal jurisdiction, this Court cannot extend Henderson

6

form selection clause.

7

drew a distinction between form selection clauses and consent

8

to jurisdiction clauses.

9

did not.

10
11

The Court in, in Henderson

to a

certainly

I understand that the lead opinion

But that lead opinion is just a plurality opinion

based on this concurrence.
THE COURT: In the statute, given the status of the

12

law in this state, I mean, the way you're presenting this case,

13

or the fact that this feels like first impression when you come

14

right down to it, and our best direction is Phone

15

and Wyoming law to the extent that you can find some.

16

a fair statement?

17
18

MR. OLSON: I don't think so.
necessarily a case of first impression.

Directories
Is that

I don't think it's
I guess, I guess the

19 J Court is correct in stating that no reported Utah decision has
20
21

ever had the same facts as this case.
THE COURT: Oh, yeah.

22
23
24

[over talking]
MR. OLSON: So, yeah, I guess that's, the fact that
makes it a case of first impression, then I think the Court is

25 J correct there.

Are there standards in Utah that govern this
6

case?

Yes.

That's why we think it's not a case of first

impression.

But there is Utah law that governs here.

Based on the concurrences in the Phone

Directories

case, where Justice Howe comes back and says no, the form
selection clauses are governed by the Prows
back to the Prows

case we have to go

case and figure out whether the Prows

case

enacted some sort of exception to the minimum contacts
analysis.

We know that it didn't.

In Prows

the Court was

looking at venue and that is the distinction that we're drawing
here.

Consent to jurisdiction clauses are agreements as to

personal jurisdiction.
as to venue.

Form selection clauses are agreements

They're completely separate issues.

THE COURT: [inaudible] that distinction.

Now I mean

you agree to venue, but without jurisdiction isn't venue
meaningless?

It, I mean when we're outside, when we're going

from state to state.

I can see if someone is going to a venue

different within a state, which wouldn't have anything to do
with an interstate agreement.

But how does that help?

MR. OLSON: Your Honor, we don't know what the
parties, we don't know what the parties proposed and perhaps
rejected in that case.

That evidence is not before the court.

We have no way of saying with any certainty that, that Jacobsen
didn't propose consent to jurisdiction clause to the defendants
and that was rejected.

We have no way of saying that did or

7

1

didn't happen -

2

THE COURT: But this involves -

3

MR. OLSON: We're stuck with -

4

THE COURT: [inaudible] let's suppose they did and

5

jurisdiction was rejected, venue was accepted.

6

ever in fact trigger and use the venue if you don't have

7

jurisdiction?

8

I just don't see how you can have venue here if you can't get

9

the body here.

(inaudible).

How could you

I mean I may be missing something.

10

MR. OLSON: I understand that.

I understand that.

11

THE COURT: And that's one of the underlying concerns

12

I have here, whether this form selection clause has any meaning

13

and we go back.

14

is people take the contract they write.

15

exceptions and [inaudible] a question of ambiguity and beyond.

16

But if it's not ambiguous, it's only going to be bound by what

17

they did unless it's a policy or statute as it was, is that

18

statute in Utah law.

19

here.

One thing our Supreme Court is pretty clear on
And there are

But again, I'm not sure that applies

You see my problem?

Is it really meaningless?

20

MR. OLSON: I don't think it's meaningless.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22

MR. OLSON: There could have been facts after they

23

negotiate, or there could have been events that took place

24

after they negotiated that contract that would have given them

25

jurisdiction in Utah.

None of those events have come to pass.

1
2

THE COURT: - venue and then they would have found
their jurisdiction through contacts or some other effect.

3

MR. OLSON: Absolutely.

4

THE COURT: And that would be the main one.

5

MR. OLSON: Absolutely.

The bottom line is, yes,

6

court's hold parties to the terms of their contracts and their

7

not -

8
9

THE COURT: I was thinking in terms of how this is
presented in the, in the light of where we are today, that

10

would appear not be giving them the ability to bring up here.

11

But there could be circumstances, I understand.

12

MR. OLSON: There could, and, and this contract was

13

signed a few years ago.

14

the parties mind at the time.

15

what we have in front of us in this contract, and there is no -

16

We don't know what was going through
All we, all we know is what,

THE COURT: There's no boilerplate.

They did

17

negotiate a place of litigation.

They also negotiated a law

18

and they were two different things to control.

19

talking and negotiating.

So they were

20

MR. OLSON: That's correct.

That's correct.

21

I would say, Your Honor, that Utah courts have drawn

22

a distinction between the two types of provisions.

In

23

Henderson,

24

responded to Justice Howe in her lead opinion by pointing out

25

that it doesn't matter what he says about a form selection

for example, Justice Durham very easily could have

1

clause, because they're essentially the same thing.

2

selection clause is essentially a consent to jurisdiction, so

3

let's focus on the consent to jurisdiction analysis and

4

everything else about form selection clauses is meaningless.

5

Form

THE COURT: I agree with you they're not the same

6

thing.

But there is some overlap I believe and my question I

7

guess is can you have some implied consent in a forum selection

8

and then you express consent in a consent jurisdiction where if

9

you've got consent to jurisdiction you need nothing more.

10

you have a forum selection with an implied consent, you may

11

need more like the rational nexus.

If

I mean is that a fair

12 I distinction?
13

MR. OLSON: Some cases have gone that way.

14

pointed out in our, in our memoranda, Jacobsen's directed the

15

court to some cases from other jurisdictions that have gone

16

that way, that have found implied consent.

17

effort to distinguish those cases, because that's what those

18 I cases hold.

As we've

I haven't taken any

There are also cases, as I've cited, in other

19

states that stand for the opposite view, that point out that

20

there is no overlap.

21

clause is a consent to jurisdiction, while a forum selection

22

clause is merely a stipulation as to venue.

23

have drawn that distinction.

Rather, that a consent to jurisdiction

So other courts

24 I

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

25 I

MR. OLSON: Utah courts, well we're stuck with what
10

Utah says.

We're stuck with what the Utah Supreme Court has

handed us and in Utah the courts have drawn a distinction
between the two. The courts have never pointed out that there's
any overlap between the two and again, based on Justice
Durham's failure to respond in any way to Justice Howe's
concurrence regarding the separation between the two and the
different analysis that applies to the two, we don't see any
way that the court can find there's some sort of confluence
between the two types of provisions.
We would argue, Your Honor, taking it a step further
and I would like to, you know, I could spend all day talking
about this Henderson

case and it might not get us anywhere.

What I would like to do is proceed to some of the Court's
concerns with respect to what the Henderson
we square ourselves under that.
determine that Henderson

standard is and how

Even if the Court is to

applies, that there is some sort of

implied consent to jurisdiction, and again we dispute that and
I've explained that already, even if we're to buy into
Jacobsen's argument that there was an implied consent to
personal jurisdiction and that Henderson
to satisfy this Henderson
correctly stated the test.

applies, we still have

rational nexus test.

The Court has

There has to be a -rational nexus

between this state and either the parties to, either the
parties to or the subject matter of the contract.

In

Henderson

11

1

there were both.

Not only was there a connection between both

2

parties to Utah.

But there was also a connection between the

3

subject matter of the contract and Utah and perhaps that's what

4

the Court is missing, and, you know, it's stating, Your Honor,

5

stating the concern that, you know, maybe we just need either

6

of the parties, because you know we may never have a case where

7

we've got both defendants that are residents of the State of

8

Utah, then there would really be no meaning to, to this test.

9

But that's not what the standard is

10

THE COURT:

- there'd be no meaning.

11

would be such an easy decision there -

12

MR. OLSON: Correct.

13

THE COURT:

I mean it

- in fact, probably if you had both

14

parties to resident here they wouldn't be contesting it is

15

really what I'm saying.

16

convenient.

17

of course what we're trying to avoid is the remote forum to

18

both.

I think that's one reason we have the rational nexus

19

test.

I mean we've got Wyoming and Utah, we don't want a

20

Delaware forum, and that wouldn't make a lot of sense to any of

21

us.

22

I mean we, I think we've all seen contracts stranger than that.

23

But that's really what I'm asking, why does it need to be both

24

and most cases where they are both, I don't think you'd have an

They'd be happy to be here, it's

In most cases you're only going to have one, and

People might do it, they might do it just to be difficult.

25 I issue there, I guess what I'm saying.
12

MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I don't think it's just a
matter of convenience.
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. OLSON: I don't think that the rational nexus test
is merely limited to preventing inconvenience to the parties.
It goes a lot further than that.
state that in the Henderson

The court certainly didn't

case.

When you look at Henderson

-

and this is what's important - there was a connection to Utah
for both parties.

The defendant in that case, he was a

resident of California, but he telephoned the plaintiff's
office in Utah to request employment.

The very employment

contract at issue he signed at the Utah office of plaintiff.
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).
MR. OLSON:

He telephoned the office to continue

negotiating the contract.

Once it was finally complete and he

had a copy of it, he then mailed it to the Utah office.

So the

defendant in that case, had a connection with Utah just as the
plaintiff Phone

Directories

is a Utah corporation with its

principle place of business in Utah.
Here we do not have that.

We have no connection

whatsoever between the defendants and the plaintiff and that is
the distinction between Phone

Directories

major leap of faith to extend Phone
and then find that under Phone

and it would be a

Directories

Directories

to this case

we have this

13

1

connection with both parties.

2

his company, the two defendants, they have absolutely no

3

contact with Utah.

4
5

Here we've got Mr. Hunter and

We've submitted -

THE COURT: That's absolutely accepted for this
argument.

6

MR. OLSON: Yeah, that hasn't been disputed so far in

7

this case.

We've submitted an affidavit and there hasn't been

8

any, any contrary evidence provided.

9

contacts, there are none, there's no basis for this Court

But based on those

10

extending personal jurisdiction in this case.

11

that just because one party has a connection to Utah we have a

12

rational nexus between either the parties to or the subject

13

matter of the contract.

14
15

You can't say

THE COURT: Well, what's it mean to have a rational
nexus to a party?

16

MR. OLSON: There has to be some connection to that

17

state.

As the court explained it's something lesser than

18

minimum contacts analysis.

We concede that.

19

show purposeful availment.

You don't have to show something

20

beyond some tenuous contact with Utah.

21

the minimum contacts, contacts, you know, a couple of telephone

22

calls are probably not going to get you personal jurisdiction

23

or a letter drafted is not going to get you personal

24

jurisdiction.

You don't have to

Like for example, in

Even entering into a contract with a Utah entity

25 I does not alone get you personal jurisdiction.

Here 14

1

THE COURT:

Not - but, but I'm talking about the, the

2

rational connection nexus with that party.

3

they're very much I guess a Salt Lake County entity.

4

doesn't that satisfy?

5

One party to the agreement and the actual transaction being a

6

Utah, Salt Lake County resident I assume of long standing, the

7

name looks familiar, but I mean is that not, I guess, am I

8

missing something on what rational nexus would be required?

9

Assuming one party's enough.

10
11

Jacobsen's a party,
Why

I mean is that not a rational nexus?

MR. OLSON: Sure.

I know you don't concede that.

Assuming one party is enough, yeah,

Jacobsen certainly has a rational nexus to Utah.

12

THE COURT: All right.

13

MR. OLSON: If that were the standard.

14

Honor, that's correct.

15

standard and that you have -

16

So yes, Your

Our position is that that's not the

THE COURT: I mean you can come back to anything you
But we've talked about Phone

Directories

17

want.

18

tells us about the impact of a forum selection and/or a consent

19

to jurisdiction clause on the need for otherwise showing a

20

basis for personal jurisdiction, what should, shouldn't we be

21

looking at Wyoming law on this?

22

And if so, what is there?

MR. OLSON: Here's, here's why we're not looking to

23

Wyoming law.

24

and I'll explain the difference.

25

and what it

Well, here's how, why we are to a certain extent

THE COURT: Okay.
15

1

MR. OLSON: Personal jurisdiction issues are governed

2

by Utah's long arm s tatute and the due process clause .

3

pretty clear from Utah law.

That's

4

THE COURT: Yeah.

5

MR. OLSON: And in Utah court, at least with respect

6
7

to the personal jurisdiction issue THE COURT: I think they have to be because where

8

we' re starting the j urisdiction have to do so within the

9

boundaries of the constitution.

But then -talking about impact

10

of the court which is part of the contract and the

11

interpretation of the contract is governed by Wyoming,

12

MR. OLSON: Exactly.

We have clarified that in our,

13

in our briefs.

14

have stuck pretty closely to that.

15

the form selection clause, or I'm sorry, of the consent to

16

jurisdiction clause is governed by Wyoming law.

17

interpretation of it -

18
19

I think, I think both of us have, have stuck,
That the interpretation of

That is the

THE COURT: - talk us to the impact of it on
jurisdiction analysis because that's Utah.

20

MR. OLSON: Precisely.

21

THE COURT: [inaudible] back and forth here I'm

22
23
24
25

struggling with.
MR. OLSON: But that's precisely it.

That, that's the

distinction, so THE COURT: Okay.
16

MR. OLSON:

- we can look to Utah - we can look to

Wyoming law which states generally the same as Utah law that,
you know, it's consistent with what was stated in the

Prows

case that those are generally enforced, except when they're
unreasonable, and THE COURT: It seems like a different standard on
reasonable, the best I could tell.

It seems like it might be

harder to show unreasonable in Wyoming than it is in Utah,
apart from the statute.
MR. OLSON: Perhaps.

We don't have a lot of case law

on that unfortunately.
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. OLSON: We've got this, we've got this one Wyoming
case that's a very recent case, I think it's a 2000 case, this
Deardall

case, where the court comes out and generally seems to

follow the restatement.

We've got the Prows

case in 1993 in

Utah that generally seems to follow the restatement.

In

Prows

perhaps you could say it's a more lenient standard because in
Prows

the court found it unenforceable, while in this Wyoming

case it was found to be enforceable.
we're dealing with the same issue.

But I think generally
Both cases state that they

will not be enforced if they are unreasonable, -and the party
claiming unreasonableness does have a high burden to meet in
establishing that they're unreasonable.

17

1

But the reason that, that, that this Wyoming law and

2

the enforceability of the forum selection clause is not really

3

at the crux of this argument is that in neither of those cases

4

that is in all of the governing cases we have on the

5

enforceability of forum selection clauses personal jurisdiction

6

was not at issue.

7

say, you know, this is a jurisdiction issue.

8

cases the court was looking at a motion under 12(b)(3) to

9

dismiss for lack of venue.

The court, the court didn't come out and
In both of those

10

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

11

MR. OLSON: We're dealing with venue issues here and

12

that's all we have in both of those cases and that's one of the

13

reasons we would argue that that is a venue issue, it is not a

14

jurisdiction issue.

15

of that all we want, but even if it's enforceable, then you're

16

still going to have to get over the hurdle of personal

17

jurisdiction, and that is what they can't get over in this

18

case.

19

So we can argue about the enforceability

But the final issue, Your Honor, and then I'll sit

20

down unless the Court has any other questions, is that if the

21

forum selection clause is unenforceable, then, you know, we're

22

not even going to get to the court, to their position that

23

there's some sort of implied consent to personal jurisdiction.

24
25

THE COURT: No, I agree.
is absolutely [inaudible] and -

I think the enforceability

1

MR. OLSON: So, and we've addressed that in our briefs

2

and I'm not going to rehash all the arguments, but I, I will

3

just emphasize the one point that we raised that in, that in

4

Utah we have a public policy against enforcing Wyoming

5

contract, or enforcing -

6

THE COURT: I'm really interested in your position

7

that, that could be a measure under Wyoming law or is that what

8

you're really saying?

9

not even under Wyoming law deem something enforceable that Utah

Are you saying here in Utah we should

10

simply would not as a matter of public policy.

11

Utah even get a say in this?

12

MR. OLSON: Utah does.

I mean does

In determining whether to

13

extend comity to another state, Utah courts look to Utah public

14

policies. That has been established.

15

reply brief -

16
17

We've cited a case in our

[over talking]
THE COURT: But is comity the same as if, if we're

18

following an agreement or by Wyoming law, is that a comity

19

question or the parties contract we're abiding by?

20

MR. OLSON:

That's a good question.

I think, I think

21

it's still a comity question because the court is looking to

22

Wyoming law.

23

law of another state, then that is a comity question.

24

When a court in Utah is being asked to extend the

THE COURT: I guess it's true to say that under comity

25 I the law of the selected state, I mean this doesn't seem as
19

1

egregious as some, but I could think of an egregious example,

2

We all could.

3

related to slavery or something.

4

going to do here?

5

stretching it a little.

6

Go back a 100 or so years and it might be
So you say, oh, what am I

So I guess that's the analogy, although I'm

MR. OLSON: Well, yeah, taking that analogy, say there

7

is a contract for slavery and we know in Utah there are public

8

policies against that, you know, going back a 100 years -

9
10

THE COURT: More than a hundred.
MR. OLSON: There still are.

There still are public

11

policies against that. But using that, using the Court's

12

analogy, you have a contract provision that under Utah law

13

would be against Utah public policy, and that's exactly what we

14

have here.

15

public policy that this Court is being asked to hold up and we

16

think that's the result that should not, should not happen

17

based on Utah public policy, which does govern this analysis.

We have something that we think is against Utah

18

THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative).

19

MR. OLSON: And we would add, Your Honor, taking it a

20

step further, based on the fact that this Court lacks personal

21

jurisdiction in this case, this choice of venue, of course,

22

should not be enforced.

23

Court does not need to enforce the party's choice of venue if

24

there is no personal jurisdiction.

That, that goes without saying.

The

That is one reason that

25 J that is unenforceable, and based on that the Court should go
20

1

ahead and dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) (2).

2
3

THE COURT: Thank you for an excellent argument, Mr.
Olson.

4

Mr. Ball?

5

MR. BALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

6

Preliminarily, Your Honor, Mr. Olson suggested that

7

it was, we had to cross some sort of a hurdle here today. Mr.

8

Olson's the moving party, of course, and has the burden of

9

establishing that there is in fact no personal jurisdiction if

10

that indeed is what he is trying to do.

11

burden to meet here in the sense that Mr. Olson suggests that

12

we do.

13

So we don't have a

Now if you, if you were to read Henderson

as we've,

14

as has been discussed today, to require a nexus with, with

15

only, with both of the parties before the Court, I can't see

16

and I've read the case carefully as has everybody else here, I

17

can't see how Henderson

18

it seems to me that the court at that time in that case was,

19

was announcing an exception.

20

read, really to be read to require a nexus with both of the

21

parties, I don't see how it adds anything to the law.

22

if we're prepared to accept that this, this rational nexus is

adds a single thing to the law.

I mean

But if it, if the case is to be

I mean

23 | somehow a reduced standard from minimum contacts, the court did
24

a very poor job of suggesting, you know, where that line ought

25 [ to actually be drawn and if that, you know, if that was what
21

1

they were doing it was somewhat revolutionary at least and I

2

would have expected them to have given us some more guidance

3

than they did.
And I think - Teton Builders is really just

4
5

absolutely, I mean I've read all their Br.iefs.

6

to the argument and I still haven't heard an answer to the, to

7

what I think is the fundamental question ]here and that is these

8

peopl e agreed, 1this company agreed to lit igate here and they

9

never• have answered the question satis factorily why should they

10

be allowed, why should they want and why should they be allowed

11

to suddenly back pedal away from that agreement?

12

raised a due process concern earlier, Your Honor, and I think

13

that that concern is quite easily taken care of with the fact

14

that they just agreed to litigate here.

15

gotten into the nuance of personal juris -

16

I've listened

I think you

They may not have

THE COURT: Well, I think, maybe it's not a good

17

analogy, but I think of the old jurisdiction cases where they

18

say, you know, if you avail yourself the benefits of acting

19

within a foreign state you should expect to be held within that

20

state.

21

step.

22

will be, at least venue, as Mr. Olson says.

23

whether it's more than venue, whether it's jurisdiction, but,

24

yeah, it does seem to me to some extent the due process

25

concern.

This isn't the same, but you've intentionally taken a
You've done business with someone from a state and venue
The question is

22

1

MR. BALL: I think it's quite, as I say, readily taken

2

care of and although the contract doesn't get into the nuance

3

of personal jurisdiction necessarily, at least explicitly, it's

4

pretty clear that they agreed to litigate here.

5

uses that, you know, uses the phrase that litigation will take

6

place in Utah.

7
8

I think it

THE COURT: Arbitration, litigation or something like
that.

9

MR. BALL: Yeah, and this can't be a surprise to them.

10

They can't be taken off guard and they can't seriously contend

11

that they didn't really agree to be hailed into court here.

12

Whether they agreed to be subject to the court's jurisdiction

13

or not, expressly, and I don't think that that concern has been

14

addressed at all by Teton Builders anywhere.

15

Now without wishing to, to bore the Court with

16

rehashing what it's already dealt with and heard, I suggest to

17

you, to the Court that, that the forum selection clause in this

18

contract just has to be read to include a consent to

19

jurisdiction, an implied consent to jurisdiction.

20

absolutely meaningless if not, and it's, as we all know the

21

Court has a responsibility and a duty to, to give meaning to -

22

THE COURT: Well, and you gave me a lot of cases from

It is

23

other jurisdictions and I appreciated your thoroughness.

24

take a minute on what Justice Howe was doing in

25

Directories,

But

Phone

I mean whether that does mean we've got to treat
23

1

them sep>arately.

2

MR. BALL: I wish I understood what Justice Howe was

3

doing and I'm afraicd I simply don't.

4

me that he even intended there to be a disti nction.

5

at all clear to me

8
9

It's not

THE COURT : Well, I'm not sure I'm persuaded of :It

6
7

It's not at all clear to

either.

But there' s, there's some evidence of it there.
MR. BALL: There is some, but even if, even if there

is a distinct ion as Mr. Olson suggests, that there should be

10

under Justice Howe's concurrence, we submit, Your Honor, that

11

it's irrelevant.

12

did in Henderson

13

Wyoming law controls here and what the court
really has no bearing on this case at all.

THE COURT: Wyoming controls as to enforceability and

14

as to whether that's sufficient to deal what the contacts issue

15

or just as to enforceability?

16
17
18

MR. BALL: I suggest to you that it applies to both,
Your Honor, and we've briefed it and THE COURT: Even when Utah though is the state

19

ultimately exerting the jurisdiction, which has constitutional

20

ramifications.

21

we're going to exert jurisdiction, shouldn't it be on the basis

22

of our own law and we stand behind it, right or wrong in that -

23
24
25

I mean at some point if we're going to say

MR. BALL: As you pointed out earlier, Utah extends
jurisdiction to the fullest limits of due process.
THE COURT: Yeah.
24

1

MR. BALL: And I think I, you know, I've addressed the

2

fact that I can't see how due process could in any way be

3

offended in this case by exerting jurisdiction over Teton

4

Builders when they've agreed to litigate here.

5

knowingly signed a contract with a provision in that wasn't

6

hidden, wasn't boilerplate, wasn't in small print, that clearly

7

indicates that the parties will litigate here.

When they

8

THE COURT: Setting that aside for a minute because I

9

do understand that position, back to what Wyoming law controls

10

and what it doesn't if you'd clarify for me.

11

tracked you there a little.

12

I may have side

MR. BALL: No, not at all, Your Honor.

It's our

13

position that Wyoming law controls both the interpretation of

14

the contract and because the parties agreed that Wyoming law

15

would govern everything to do with the contract, that it

16

controls jurisdiction as well.

17

whether it does or does not, I think is ultimately irrelevant

18

because I think jurisdiction lies here whether you go with the

19

Deardall

20

Henderson

21

earlier, the rational nexus, Henderson

22

it doesn't require only rational nexus with one. of the parties,

23

which we quite clearly have here and I think Mr. Olson concedes

24

that we have here.

25

ought to be the same and that is that jurisdiction lies here.

At the end of the day though

analysis of reasonableness or whether you go with
and the rational nexus because as I mentioned
doesn't add anything if

So, whichever way we get there, the result

25

1

Even if for some reason we, we have a problem

2

implying a consent to jurisdiction into this form selection

3

clause, and we didn't brief this terribly thoroughly, but I

4

think it's pretty clear that we have a waiver here.

5

knowing relinquishment, voluntary relinquishment of a known

6

right.

That's the standard that's set out in the Gees

7

Doughty

case and, of course, having agreed explicitly to

8

litigate here, I don't know how Teton Builders could in any way

9

seriously argue that they haven't voluntarily relinquished

We have

Dorfey

10

their right.

11

head when they signed the contract or anything of that nature.

12

So there's, the contract was clearly voluntarily entered into

13

and they clearly could have, although obviously didn't bargain

14

for the right to litigate in Wyoming.

15

problems with the forum selection clause, even if there's a, an

16

important absence there, I think we have got a waiver and the

17

same time - and therefore, we can get to the same place along

18

either path.

19

They're not claiming that a gun was held to their

So even if we've got

Now I mentioned earlier that it, that it's Teton

20

Builders burden before the Court today to show that this, this

21

contract provision is unreasonable and in Deardall

22

that it's a heavy burden.

23

burden and, of course, they really haven't come close in my

24

estimation to meeting that heavy burden.

we learn

It's not just a burden, it's a heavy

Teton Builders' best

25 I argument is based on this Utah statute that clearly I think
26

1

under the terms of the contract which provide that Wyoming law

2

governs has no bearing on, on the court's decision today -

3

THE COURT:

Are you going to address the comity

4

argument?

5

we enforce anything under Wyoming law if it is repugnant to

6

Utah public policy, especially when it's addressed as

7

explicitly as in our statute?

8
9

I'd rather enjoy it if so.

In terms of why should

MR. BALL: I think we have to address Wyoming law,
because that's what the parties agreed the court would address.

10

Mr. Olson hasn't provided us any indication of what Wyoming's

11

public policy suggests about a contract of this nature.

12

we're, all we have is this, is the Utah statute, which

13

admittedly suggest that there's a public policy in Utah.

14

this is a Wyoming construction project.

15

from Wyoming.

16

have any bearing on anything to do with this case.

17

agreed that in fact it wouldn't have anything to do with this

18

case.

19

looking to Wyoming, that Wyoming law therefore should govern

20

and I think comity is -

21

All

But

One of the parties is

There's no reason that a Utah statute needs to
The parties

So in terms of comity, everybody expected us to be

THE COURT: Is it a question of degree of repugnance?

22

I mean we did an analogy that's pretty out there, but I mean is

23

there some point where the public policy is so strong that we

24

would say forget Wyoming law, we're not going to follow it?

25 I That somewhere on the continuum it's okay or is that not even
27

an issue?
MR. BALL: I don't know that I have an answer to that
3

quest.ion, Your Hono:c.

4

therei is a point on the continuum or not.

5

what we have here and that is we have Wyoming law. So, I don't

6

know how to answer *that question, I'm afraid.

7
8
9

I don't know whether, what the, whether
Either way, we have

THE COURT : Well, that's a candid answer.

I']rci not

sure I do.
MR. BALL: At the end of the day, Your Honor, unless,

10

unless you have further questions for me, I submit that this is

11

a pretty straightforward case.

12

doesn't include -

13

If the forum selection clause

THE COURT: That's probably our strongest point of

14

disagreement about being straightforward.

Straightforward sort

15

of, but it's a very close call for me, I'll be very candid.

16

MR. BALL: I understand.

17

THE COURT: And I'm leaning towards your side and I

18

think I'm going to rule for your side.

But it's close.

19

Because there's a number of issues counter

20

policies, considerations.

21

out, I'm inclined to say we can accept jurisdiction, I'll be

22

more specific in a moment, within the bounds of the due process

23

clause and under those circumstances we should

24

agree with the parties and we should leave it to the Supreme

25

Court to tell us if we're off base, but I think at some point

[inaudible]

But I do think when you spell it all

[inaudible]

28

1

you're going to have t,o be clearer on this issue of forum

2

selection consent to ^ uris diction.

So -

3

MR. BALL: I thin k that would be very helpful.

4

THE COURT: Yeah, it wouldI have been.

I'm not sure

I'd rather see you resolve it.

5

that this case be the one.

6

But, why don't you sit down?
I'm telling you candidly, Mr. 01 son, I think you've

7
8

done a tremendous job and I think i.t's, it is close.

9

close as I read it carefully for a couple of h ours last night,

It felt

10

as I read , the only case I read in detail was [inaudible]

11

Services and your Prows,

12

closer.

13

me if I'm just off, okay.

14

what.

15

and your argument made it still even

But I'm still, I'll tell you my basic summary and tell
Again, [inaudible] argue no matter

Essentially the parties contracted for a forum

16

selection clause.

17

law in this state that we're going to honor the contracts of

18

the parties, sometimes even when it leads to what perhaps may

19

not be a very equitable result and I say that partly because I

20

was reversed a couple of years ago on not enforcing an

21

arbitration clause.

22

didn't give them anything.

23

and if we don't successfully arbitrate within 60 days it's back

24

to square one and rescind, and my position from the bench was

25

there's no meaningful dispute resolution here, you just stall

Now I think we have a strong line of case

Well, the arbitration clause in fact
It was like we agree to arbitrate

29

1

for 60 days and there's nothing.

2

a very good decision in which he very courteously pointed out

3

that it didn't make a lot of sense to him either, but it's what

4

they contracted for, and that's what they enforced and that

5

comes up in many different contexts.

6

I think Justice Wilkins wrote

So without ambiguity, without undue influence or

7

something of the kind, the contract I think is a very important

8

beginning point.

9

we all agree Wyoming law applies.

Then we go to enforceability.

There I think

Wyoming has a high standard.

10

It says basically we're going to enforce these clauses.

11

think given the Wyoming standard of enforceability, there's a

12

strong suggestion that as long as the contract is there, it

13

also implies consent and that's what I believe happens here,

14

under Wyoming law.

15

I

I think we then do shift to Utah law to decide if

16

this implied consent is sufficient to also extend jurisdiction

17

to someone who otherwise is neither doing business generally or

18

has established minimum contacts.

19

argument and ruling there are no minimum contacts, no general

20 J jurisdiction.

For the purposes of this

But I find that under Utah law there is, under

21

foreign services, a rational nexus to one party and one party

22

is enough.

23
24

The public policy concern you identified very well in
the comity argument.

25 I continuum.

I think if it applies at all, it is a

I think there could be a type of circumstance in a
30

1

public policy where we absolutely would sa^T, you know, this

2

just offends all our notions of, say, fair play, which gets us

3

into due process, [.inaudible] due process, and thlen at that

4

point we'd probably disregard Wyoming law.

5

in th is case that i<dentifies to that extent. and I\ thin k that

6

the a greement, the relationship to the stat,e, the knowledge of

7

where the venue is certainly is sufficient to assure that

8

tradi tional notions of fair play and substantial justice are

9

not c ffended and so I'm denying the motion to dismiss, and I

I've seen 1nothing

10

hope you two, if you're not there now, get to the point where

11

you enjoy Friday mornings starting this way as much as I have.

12

Thank you.

13

Prepare the order Mr. Ball, sir.

14

MR. BALL: Thank you, Your Honor.

15

MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

16

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 |
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned hearing held before Judge Robert K.
Hilder was transcribed by me from a video recording
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages
to the best of my ability.
Signed this 24th day of November, 2003 in Sandy,
Utah.

(U£^v- JuU^b&s1
Carolyn Erickson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber
My Commission expires May 4, 2006
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Prepared and Submitted by:
Stephen E.W. Hale (5285)
Jeffrey D. Stevens (8496)
Matthew J. Ball (9414)

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

>AUG 2 0 2003
SALT LAKE COUNTY

PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C.

185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-532-7840
Facsimile: 801-532-7750

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK
OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

VS.

TETON BUILDERS, a Wyoming corporation,
and THOMAS R. HUNTER, an individual,

Civil No. 030905324
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

Defendants Teton Builders and Thomas R. Hunter's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction came before the Court for hearing on August 8, 2003, at
8:30 a.m. Plaintiff Jacobsen Construction Company, Inc. was represented at the hearing by Matthew
J. Ball of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. Defendants were represented by Erik A.
Olson of Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
576S0v 1 - M J B

The Court has reviewed the memoranda and supporting evidence filed by the parties, having
heard the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is DENIED.
DATED this ^ 3 £ d a y ofTvfep*****""

2003.

By the Court:

W
Robert
Third Distrft
r

HtK6^^ v^

Approved as to form:

R. Stephen Marshall
Erik A. Olson
Attorney for Defendants
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